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[ The October 2003 deportation of French terror suspect Willy Brigitte highlights 
the legal and political usages of recently conferred and controversial counter-
terrorism detention and questioning laws. This article explores the executive con-
tention upon a comparison with the French system, Australian detention and ques-
tioning powers require significant expansion. Executive usages of the Brigitte 
incident in response to terrorism display alarming trends steadily eroding rule of 
law principles and undermining the institutions and practices of Australian democ-
racy. 
The article analyses ASIO detention and questioning powers and subsequent and 
possible expansions. It demonstrates that the constant review, re-working and re-
visiting of those powers is a more overt politicisation of counter-terrorism re-
sponses, employs executive mandated review at the expense of more measured, 
deliberative and democratic practice and leads to the attrition of rights as the 
legislation’s “balance” is continually contested.  The indefinite nature of the ter-
rorism threat and the restraint on such responses as political only, in the absence of 
a bill of rights, makes these developments of real concern. The article argues, 
through several illustrations, that claims for expanded detention and questioning 
powers have been inappropriately presented. The article concludes that there is 
neither a rational nor substantiated case for the claim to loosen constraints on 
already unprecedented counter-terrorism detention and questioning powers.] 
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I’m saying that we do not have the powers that theyhave in France to be 
able to detain people for the purposes of questioning, that they have in 
France. That’s the only point I’m making. The powers that we have, have 
been significantly circumscribed by the requirements that the Parliament 
sought when the legislation was debated.1 
The cooperation between Australia and France in relation to Brigitte 
clearly worked. It has clearly been successful…I would say that was a 
pretty good outcome, mon ami.2 
It might be a campaign also to support the legislation in Australia. The 
Australian might want to come out with a law or something to reduce the 
right of defence, to reduce the liberty and they might take the Brigitte case 





A  The factual background of the Brigitte incident 
The arrest and deportation in October 2003 of French national Willy Brigitte, al-
leged to have been involved in the planning of unspecified terrorist activities in 
Sydney and having links to al-Qaeda, has generated in nse and continuing interest 
in the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. Brigitte, previously suspected by 
French authorities of terrorism related involvement leading up to the 1998 Rugby 
World Cup, obtained a tourist visa to visit Australia in May 2003. Initial informa-
tion was not however received by ASIO from the French authorities until 22 Sep-
tember, including that he reportedly participated in terrorist training, a 
communication that was treated as routine. Some ten days passed and the French 
received no reply to their first communication. On Friday 3 October, the French 
authorities sent a second communication, indicating that Brigitte may have been in 
Australia in connection with terrorism related activity and that he was ‘possibly 
dangerous’.4  That communication was not acted upon by ASIO until Tuesday 7 
                                                    
1 Attorney General Hon Philip Ruddock, ‘Press Conference Announcing A Review of Migration Litiga-
tion and Answering Questions On Deportation Of French National’, Transcript 27 October 2003 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Web+Pages/D001D7DF29EB8> (19 November  
2003). 
2 Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon Alexander Downer, House of Representatives, Hansard,  4 
November 2003, 21847. 
3 Brigitte’s Guadelopean-based lawyer, Harry Durimel, interviewed by ABC Foreign Correspondent 
journalist Evan Williams in December 2003 for Four Corners, Transcript: <http://www.abc.net.au/4  
corners/content/2004/20040209_brigitte/int_durimel.htm> (24 February 2004). 
4 See ABC Four Corners, ‘Willie Brigitte’ broadcast, 9 February 2004, Transcript:  
 
2004 Brigitte and the French Connection  575     
 
October, the relevant communications area being closed for the intervening Labour 
Day holiday weekend in the Australian Capital Territo y.5 
 
Brigitte was placed under immigration detention for breach of his visa conditions 
on 9 October 2003 and deported on 17 October 2003,6 being subsequently detained 
by the French authorities. It was subsequently suggested that he would be released 
due to a lack of substantive evidence relating to terrorist activities.7  However, 
according to transcripts of an interrogation conducted by a French anti-terrorism 
magistrate, Brigitte has admitted presence at the Lashkar E. Tayiba complex near 
Lahore, Pakistan in 2001-2002.8 In November 2003, Lashkar E Tayiba was pro-
scribed as a terrorist organisation in Australia,9 thus attracting the operation of 
provisions of the Criminal Code Act (Cth)10 inserted by the Security Legislation 









                                                                                                                       
<http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s1040952.htm> (24 February 2004) ; Hon  
Philip Ruddock ‘Search Warrants After Australia-France Terrorism Link’ Media Release 26 October  
2003 <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2>    
 (1 November 2004).  See also House of Representatives, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 21727 (Hon 
Philip Ruddock) and Martin Chulov, ‘Brigitte suspects: police thwarted’ The Australian, 9 February 
2004, 1. 
5 See also Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Estimates, Hansard, 16 February 
2004, 4-5 regarding the date and receipt of the first and second communications from the French authori-
ties to ASIO. 
6 Ruddock, above n 4.  See also House of Representatives, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 21727 (Hon 
Philip Ruddock). 
7 See Orietta Guerrera ‘PM defends role in terror suspect’s extradition’, The Age (Melbourne), 17 
January 2004, 6; ‘Brigitte release imminent for ‘lack of evidence’ ABC News On Line 16 January 2004  
<http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s10> 
(16 January 2004). Brigitte’s Australian spouse, Melanie Brown, was also detained whilst in France 
seeking access to Brigitte: see Alain Acco and Martin Chulov, ‘Brigitte’s wife held in Paris’, The 
Australian, 22 January 2004, 1; Freya Petersen, ‘Lawyer relaxed as Brigitte’s wife held’, The Age 
(Melbourne), 23 January 2004, 7. Reports about the presentation by French counter-terrorism authorities 
during detention to Brown of a detailed case against Brigitte contradicted such claims: see Martin 
Chulov and Alain Acco, ‘Brigitte’s duped wife turns on him’, The Australian, 28 January 2004, 1 and 
‘Brigitte’s wife to leave him’, The Age, 30 January 2004, 7. 
8 See ‘Interrogation: Willy Brigitte’, Edited transcript from the interrogations of Willie Brigitte by 
magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere, ABC Four Corners broadcast 9 February 2004  
<http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/2004029_brigitte/interrogation.htm>                         
(24 February 2004). See also transcript ‘Willie Brigitte’, Four Corners, above n 4 and transcript of 
interview with Harry Durimel, above n 3. 
9 Criminal Code Amendment (Hamas and Lashkar-E-Tayiba) Act 2003 (Cth). See further discussion 
under the subsequent heading ‘Executive control: politicising a counter-terrorism response’. 
10 See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102.2 to 102.8. 
11 See Greg Carne, ‘Terror and the ambit claim: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 
(Cth)’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 13, 13. 
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B A synopsis of the article  
This article commences with a brief examination of the political responses to the 
Brigitte incident and the institutional implications of such responses, arising from 
the executive assertion that based upon a comparison with French counter-terrorism 
laws, new ASIO detention and questioning powers requi  significant expansion. 
Such political responses evidence significant and alarming trends steadily eroding 
rule of law principles and will produce more narrowly based democratic institutions 
and practices, such risks being highlighted by various United Nations human rights 
bodies.   
 
An analysis is then made of the ASIO detention and questioning powers, to provide 
a foundation for evaluating both the Attorney-General’s claim arising from the 
Brigitte incident for enhanced power and in surveying some of the characteristics 
recent legislative reform, including the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 
(Cth). It is submitted that the constant review, re-working and re-visiting of those 
powers reflects a more overt politicisation of counter-terrorism responses. Simi-
larly, internal executive review of the powers is considered to be at the expense of 
more measured, deliberative and democratic review, providing an opportunity, 
through departmental review, for reinstating draconian characteristics of the origi-
nal bill, which are considered. In general, there is an increasing executive dimen-
sion over the complexion of the legislation, reflecting a more restricted and 
contingent quality of democracy. Executive features of the legislation and its sur-
rounding issues, as perceived by the former and present Attorneys-General, are 
examined as providing insights into the ongoing reform issues given new impetus 
by the Brigitte incident.  
 
The article then argues, in the context of issues directly arising from and relevant to 
the Brigitte incident, that the claims for expanded tention and questioning powers 
have been improperly presented and are unsubstantiated: the existing unprecedented 
detention and questioning powers being criticised out f context; inappropriate 
inter-jurisdictional comparisons being made for thepowers; favourable considera-
tion given French terrorism laws, but omitting systemic human rights abuses arising 
from those powers established by United Nations treaty bodies, the European Court 
of Human Rights and Amnesty International; confusion over criminal law versus 
intelligence gathering models; a reliance upon a highly problematic rights balancing 
model in reconciling security and liberty, as well as contradictions in an expansion 
of the powers with preferred and publicly articulated accountability models. 
 
The article concludes, through highlighting several consequences from the preced-
ing arguments, that there is neither a rational nor substantiated case for the claim to 
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C Background and context: the political response to the 
Brigitte incident 
An apparent failure of intelligence exchange and communication between France 
and Australia, resulting in a person with suspected terrorist links being admitted to 
Australia, carries considerable legal significance and a potential for significant 
political damage to the government. The Attorney General has sought to politically 
capitalise upon the incident, emphasising the effectiv ness of Australia’s co-
operative counter-terrorism arrangements. The Attorney General also hinted that 
based upon a comparison with French anti-terrorism laws, ASIO requires a signifi-
cant expansion of its recently acquired detention and questioning powers.12 This 
comparison has been used to partly explain the deportation of Brigitte on the 
grounds of the supposed inadequacy of the ASIO detention and questioning re-
gime.13 This is a remarkable claim given that these new poers were not applied to 
Brigitte14 and the fact that the powers have twice been significa tly expanded.15  
 
The apparent attempt to turn the political negative16 of Brigitte’s presence in Aus-
tralia on a tourist visa for several months and the serious attendant delays in acting 
on French intelligence communications, into a positive by claiming that signifi-
cantly and recently enhanced intelligence agency powers require further substantial 
expansion, highlights trends compromising and transforming democratic govern-
ance and the rule of law. Australian counter-terrorism legislative responses, of 
which the Brigitte incident is an illustrative example, have steadily eroded rule of 
law principles – accountability of institutions, due process, separation of power, 
scrutiny of authority, constraints on the exercise of discretions and a cogent justifi-
                                                    
12 ‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions’, ABC Lateline broadcast, 27 October 2003, Tran 
script:  <http:www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2003/s976417.htm> (19 November 2003);  ‘Interview:  
Philip Ruddock’ Sunday program broadcast 2 November 2003 Transcript  
<http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/includes/fetchcontent.asp?purl=/sunday/politica> (2 November  
2003) and ‘New anti-terrorism laws too cumbersome: Ruddock’ ABC News Online 10 November 2003  
<http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/n> (21 November  
2003).  
13 See Ruddock, above n 1 and ‘Item: Attorney-General Philip Ruddock Confirms ASIO Has Used Its 
New Powers To Interrogate Australian Associates Of French Terror Suspect Willie Brigitte’, Transcript 
10 December 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Web+Pages/446C96F9F842> (11 December  
2003). 
14 See Senate, Hansard, 2 December 2003, 18252-18253 (Senator Hon Chris Ellon); Senate, Hansard,  
2 December 2003, 18270 and 3 December 2003, 18359 (Senator Brian Greig); Senate, Hansard, 4 
December 2003, 18788 (Senator Hon Chris Ellison). See also Ruddock, above n 12; and Ruddock 
‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’, above n 12.           .
15 Firstly, in the scope of the applicable powers in the bill compared to what was mooted in the time 
leading up to the introduction of the bill and secondly, in the Government’s ‘compromise’, extending 
permissible detention on a single warrant from 48 hours to 168 hours: see the discussion in the sections 
of this article ‘Prospective change: liberalising the criteria for obtaining detention and questioning 
warrants’ and ‘ASIO Questioning and Detention Powers: A Synopsis’, which follows. See also A-G’s 
Press Releases “New Counter-Terrorism Measures” 2 October 2001  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_200> (1 November  
2004) and ‘Compromise For The Sake Of National Security’, 11 June 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Web+Pages/D7604110820D9D> (12 June 2003).  
16 See especially House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21967 (Kevin Rudd). 
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cation for intrusive powers17 – and such erosion is reflected both in the attitudes of 
the legislative proponents and in the legislation itself. As one commentator has 
pointedly observed: 
 
The core principles which distinguish liberal democrati  regimes from authoritarian 
ones – ‘the rule of law; openness and accountability of government; and the main-
tenance of a bond of trust and confidence between citizens and government that 
results from an electorate that is informed about public affairs’- have increasingly 
been put under strain by the continuing expansion of security operations according 
to a broad mandate of ‘counter-terrorism’.18 
 
This continued expansion is an identifiable trend i Australian reforms and is 
strongly reflected in the political response to the Brigitte incident. 
 
D Background and context: some institutional implica-
tions of the executive response to Brigitte incident 
The Attorney-General’s response to the Brigitte incident is distinctive for its overt 
political approach in shifting responsibility for, and in seeking remediation of a 
national security administrative and policy failure, through advocating a further 
expansion of counter-terrorism detention and interrogative powers. In contrast, 
maintaining liberal democratic values, the anathema of international terrorism, in 
the absence of a bill of rights,19 presumes political restraint and reasonableness in 
the exercise of legislative and executive power and overriding commitment to 
the characteristics of free and open societies wherever immediate party political 
advantages arise. Otherwise, incremental erosions of civil and political rights, 
brokered over potentially decades in countering terrorism, will ultimately destroy 
from within the same defining values, institutions and practices of democratic 
governance. As state authority becomes more omnipresent, a shift will occur in the 
nature of the Australian polity. 
 
The risk of this type of development has been identfi d by various United Nations 
institutions. The High Commissioner for Human Rights,20 the Commission on 
                                                    
17 See also Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws, ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and The Threat to Democracy 
(2004), 247. 
18 Hocking, above n 17, 246. 
19 Refer to the discussions on this point by George Williams: George Williams, ‘Australian Values and 
the War Against Terrorism’ (2003) 26 University Of New South Law Journal 191, 197 and George 
Williams, The Case For An Australian Bill Of Rights: Freedom In The War On Terror (2004). 
20 See, as examples, the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights And Follow-Up To The World Conference 
On Human Right,s Human Rights: A Uniting  Framework, 27 February 2002 UN Document 
E/CN.4/2002/18 especially 3-7, 9-12, 15;  ‘Action Against Terrorism Must Not Undermine Human 
Rights, Say High Commissioner For Human Rights’, Council of Europe and OSCE’ UN Press Release 
29 November 2001 
 <http://www.unchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/AD7D80AC9CB53F23C1256B1> (10 June 2002)  
including Joint Statement by UN High Commissioner fo Human Rights, Secretary General of the 
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Human Rights21 and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protecti n of 
Human Rights22 of the UN Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General,23 
the Secretary-General’s Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terror-
ism,24 the CERD Committee,25 the CAT Committee26 and the UN General Assem-
bly27 have responded to the this concern. A constant theme of these UN human 
rights bodies has been the need to produce a more holistic appraisal of the concept 
of security, so that human rights values are fully integrated with responses to terror-
ism. Such considerations are of increased significace in the Australian context, as 
the lack of a bill of rights deprives policy and legislative development of a formal 
legal mechanism to test the reasonableness, proporti nali y and necessity of serial 
counter-terrorism reforms. 
 
Whilst Australia would traditionally be described as having strong liberal-
democratic institutions, practices and traditions, amendments to the ASIO Act 1979 
(Cth) in 1999,28 200229 and 200330 have created significant enhancements of execu-
tive power of a degree and nature detrimentally impacting upon civil and political 
rights. The res gestae of the Brigitte incident and the Executive response to it sug-
gest that such movement is likely to intensify and consolidate. In the present envi-
ronment of serial claims for enhancing counter-terrorism powers, new and mooted 
                                                                                                                       
Council of Europe and Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 29 
November 2001  
< <http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/(Symbol)/OHCHR.STM.01.66.En?Open>  
(10 June 2002); and  ‘Post 11 September Efforts Should Lead To More Human Security, Not Rollback In 
Civil Liberties, UN Rights Chief Says’ (Fifth Commonwealth Lecture) UN Press Release 6 June 2002 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/C321FAFF25F1424AC1256BD0>  
(10 June 2002).  
21 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/37 23 April 2001, Human Rights and Terrorism           
<ttp://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/d2ece80ebc3b8f74c1256a40> (3 May 2003). 
 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/35 22 April 2002, Human Rights and Terrorism 
<http://www.unHchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/bab46260c4a1131bc1256ba> (3 May 2003).  
22 Terrorism and Human Rights: Second progress report prepared by Ms Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special 
Rapporteur UN Document e/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/35 17 July2002. 
23 Report of the Secretary-General on implementation of General Assembly resolution 57/219 UN  
Document <E/CN.4/2003/120 20 March 2003  
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/90504a8bb2031985c1256cf > (3 May 2003)  
24 Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism UN Document A/57/273 
S/2002/875 
25 CERD Committee Statement on racial discrimination and measures to combat terrorism UN Docu-
ment A/57/18 (Chapter XI)(C)(Statement)  
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/44f56d54190> (5 May 2003)  
26 Statement of the Committee Against Torture UN Document CAT/C/XXVII/Misc.7, 22 November 
2001 
27 General Assembly Resolution 57/219, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, 27 February 2003 UN Document A/RES/57/219; General Assembly Resolution 
56/160 Human Rights and terrorism 13 February 2002 UN Document A/RES/56/160. 
28 The ASIO Amendment Act 1999 (Cth) expanded a range of technical and other intelligence gathering 
techniques. 
29 ASIO Legislation (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2002 (Cth). This Act is discussed under the heading 
‘ASIO Questioning and Detention Powers: A Synopsis’, below. 
30 ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth). This Act is discussed under the heading ‘Recent and 
Prospective Executive Claims for Enhanced Power: ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth)’, 
below. 
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legislative reforms could exponentially erode various institutions and practices of 
Australian democracy.31   
 
The assertiveness of executive authority, as evidenced in the Brigitte incident, is 
more readily identifiable with narrower, restrictive-elite models of democracy 
driving policy and legislative development. Such characteristics are reflected in and 
reinforced by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth).32  The restrictive-
elite model of democracy33 provides for a contracted participatory function fr the 
people, limited to voting and discussion,34 to ensure the proper operation of elec-
toral requirements.35 Political initiative and activity is to be generated by those 
seeking or holding elected office.36 Consistent with the competition of politicians 
for the limited role of citizens in securing their vote, those representatives are free 
to engage in political action of their own and are not answerable to instruction from, 
or obligation towards, enfranchised citizens.37 Such protection as exists against 
arbitrary rule is largely limited to the capacity to periodically remove offending 
politicians at elections.38  
 
Features of this narrow model of democracy and its assumptions about the relations 
between the citizen and the state strongly resonate i  the conferral of detention and 
questioning powers and in the executive claims from the Brigitte incident for fur-
ther expansion of those powers. Such features include the method of a departmental 
review by the Attorney-General’s department of existing powers39 in place of the 
public forums of a Parliamentary Committee or independent inquiry; constant 
Executive inspired reform for political rather than practical policy needs; and ex-
                                                    
31 The context surrounding the reforms is important, particularly the conflation of intelligence gathering 
and criminal investigation: see Jenny Hocking, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: 
Australia’s New Security Powers of Detention, Prosciption and Control’ (2003) 49 Australian Journal 
of Politics and History 355, 364-365; Hocking, above n 17, 233 and Simon Bronnitt, ‘Constitutional 
Rhetoric v Criminal Justice Realities: Unbalanced Responses to Terrorism?’ (2003) 14 Public Law 
Review 76, 79. 
32 Especially the provisions which suppress primary and secondary communications of information 
relating to detention and questioning warrants, including media reporting: see the discussion under th 
heading ‘Recent and Prospective Executive Claims For Enhanced Power: ASIO Legislation Amendment 
Act 2003 (Cth)’, which follows. 
33 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) 105. 
34 Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) 5, in this sense involving a retreat from 
the public domain and practices of active political itizenship. 
35 Glen Patmore, ‘Making Sense of Representative Democracy and the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication in the High Court of Australia’ (1998) 7 Griffith Law Review 97, 105; Pateman, above n 
34, 5. 
36 Pateman, above n 34, 5. 
37 David Held, Models of Democracy (1987), 165; Patmore, above n 35, 106. 
38 Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Repr sentative Democracy’ (1995) 23 Federal Law 
Review 37, 47. 
39 The departmental review is discussed in more detail under the heading ‘Executive control: revisiting or 
reworking an earlier legislative ambit claim?’, whic  follows. The 2004 Parliamentary session has 
included a significant number of terrorism related l gislative reforms: see Criminal Code Amendment 
(Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2004 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act (No 3) 2004 (Cth); National Security Information (Criminal Proceed-
ings) Bill 2004 (Cth) and National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings)(Consequential Amend-
ments) Bill 2004 (Cth). 
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pressed executive dissatisfaction with negotiated Parliamentary outcomes in 
counter-terrorism legislation. Such restrictive-elite democratic model assumptions 
stand in marked contrast to the characteristics identifiable with broader democratic 
models, commonly identified as the protective,40 developmental41, participatory42 
and pluralist43 models of democracy. 
 
Distinctive and alarming political usages of national security reform may therefore 
be identified from the Brigitte incident. To fully comprehend such developments, 
discussion now turns to the legislative context from which they have emerged, 










                                                    
40 A model intended to provide structures, practices and institutions controlling those possessing political 
power over those subject to that power. This control is achieved by the accountability of enfranchise-
ment, regular elections by secret ballot, a separation of powers and freedoms of speech and public 
association: Patmore, above n 35, 97. The focus of the protective model of democracy is the protection 
of individual liberty: Kirk, above n 38, 46. The participation of the individual, whilst in the individual’s 
interest, is necessarily instrumental to the greate good of the protection of governing institutions: 
Pateman, above n 34, 19-20; Held, above n 37, 67; Crawford Brough McPherson, The Life and Times of 
Liberal Democracy (1977) 35-37. 
41 The developmental model of democracy, accepting the principles of the protective model of democ-
racy, further emphasises the moral and educational developmental benefits to the individual through 
participation in the political processes: Kirk, above n 38, 46 and Patmore, above n 35, 101-102. Political 
involvement is necessary not only for the protection of individual interests, but to create an informed, 
committed and developing citizenry and is essential to the ‘highest and harmonious’ expansion of 
individual capacities: Held, above n 37, 102. Developmental democracy is strongly associated with the 
writings of John Stuart Mill: Held, above n 37, 86. 
42 The participatory model of democracy derives from some of the rationales of developmental democ-
racy, but goes beyond the quite restricted form of participation advocated by JS Mill: see Kirk, above n 
38, 46 and Patmore, above n 35, 103. A participatory model of democracy encourages maximisation of 
individual opportunities to participate in political decisions, to develop the necessary qualities to enable 
citizens to assess the activities of representatives and hold them accountable: Patmore, above n 35, 102-
103. Participation expands beyond voting and discussion in representative government to include 
democratisation and politicisation of institutions i  which individuals can play a significant role: Pat-
more, above n 35, 104. Involvement and contestation are significantly expanded, changing relationship 
between representatives and represented and the natur  of representation itself. 
43 The pluralist model of democracy states that individual interests of the individual are best represented 
through membership of an interest group competing o p litical and policy terms with other groups to 
influence government. The political objectives of pluralism do not necessarily comprise the interests and 
values constituting the identity of the community as  whole: Jurgen Habermas ‘Three Normative 
Models of Democracy’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference Contesting The Boundaries 
of The Political (1996) 25. Pluralism assumes basic norms and rulesto regulate the contest of competing 
groups, including the role of the state as a regulator to protect group rights: Paul Hirst, Representative 
Democracy and Its Limits (1990), 16. Such a state protective capacity involves a legal order regulating 
the interaction of groups with lawmaking and enforcement capacity: Hirst, 17. 
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II ASIO QUESTIONING AND DETENTION POWERS: A SYNOPSIS 
 
A The warrant detention and questioning powers 
In June 2003, after 18 months of protracted debate and significant modifications to 
the original bill following three parliamentary committee reports,44 the ASIO Legis-
lation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth) was enacted. It conferred upon ASIO 
a range of unprecedented powers in relation to the gathering of intelligence about, 
as distinct from the criminal investigation of, a range of separately legislated terror-
ism offences,45 enacted following the September 11 2001 attacks in the United 
States. A synopsis of these special powers, directed towards the gathering of intelli-
gence and providing for incommunicado detention of n n-suspects and suspects 
alike, will be useful in assessing the claim of theAttorney-General that these pow-
ers require expansion. 
 
These warrant procedures, the liberalisation of which has now been raised by the 
Attorney-General, have previously been promoted as constituting considerable 
safeguards.46 Existing procedures for obtaining questioning and detention warrants 
                                                    
44 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelli-
gence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD Canberra, May 2002; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Provisions 
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, June 2002; Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
and Related Matters, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, D cember 2002. 
45 ‘Terrorism offence’ is defined as meaning an offenc  against Division 72 or Part 5.3 of the Common-
wealth Criminal Code: see ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 4. The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 (Cth) inserted a new Part 5.3 into the Commonwealth Criminal Code, comprehensively 
defining ‘terrorist act’ as based on an act or threat of action where the action or threat of action is made 
with the intention of advancing a political, or a religious or ideological cause. The relevant action must 
be one which (a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; (b) causes serious damage to 
property; (ba) causes a person’s death; (c) endangers a person’s life, other than the life of the person 
taking the action; (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; 
or (e) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys an electronic system. Using that definition, 
an extensive array of individual and organisational offences is created: see Commonwealth Criminal 
Code ss 101.1-101.6 and Commonwealth Criminal Code ss102.2-102.7 for offences arising from the 
power to proscribe organisations as terrorist organisations. See also Carne, above n 11, 14-15. A further 
Criminal Code (Cth) s 102.8 offence of associating with a terrorist organisation was inserted by the Anti-
Terrorism Act (No.2) 2004 (Cth). 
46The former Attorney-General, the Hon Daryl Williams AM QC MP referred to the warrant request and 
issuing process as a ‘strict safeguard’: see Attorney-General’s Press Release 21 March 2002 ‘ASIO 
Legislation Amendment Bill Introduced’  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/DB85B938C9D66B4CCA256B> 
(12 January 2004) and House of Representatives, Hansard, 20 March 2003 13172.  It is this same ‘strict 
safeguard’ that the present Attorney-General has signalled a need to significantly weaken. For a contrary 
view, see Sarah Pritchard, ‘The Counter-Terrorism Bills’ (2002) (Winter) Bar News: Journal of the NSW 
Bar Association 10, 15. 
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involves different stages of approval with corresponding criteria. The Director 
General may seek the consent of the Attorney General to request the issue of a 
warrant under s.34D of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) in relation to a named person.47  
The Attorney-General may, by writing, consent to the making of the request, if 
certain criteria are in fact satisfied, namely: 
 
(a)  that there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing thewarrant to 
be requested will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is im-
portant in relation to a terrorism offence; and 
(b)  that relying on other methods of collecting that intelligence would be in-
effective; and 
(c)   if the warrant to be requested is to authorise the person to be taken into 
custody immediately, brought before a prescribed authority immediately for 
questioning and detained – that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that if the person is not immediately taken into custody and detained, the 
person: 
(i) may alert a person involved in a terrorism offenc  that the offence 
is being investigated; or 
  (ii) may not appear before the prescribed authority; or  
  (iii) may destroy, damage or alter a record or thing the person may be 
requested in accordance with the warrant to produce.48 
 
 
Once the Attorney-General’s consent to the making of the request for a warrant has 
been obtained in accordance with s 34C(4) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), the issuing 
authority49 may issue a warrant if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that 
is important in relation to a terrorism offence.50 If the issuing authority then issues 
the warrant it must be in the same terms as the draft warrant forming part of the 
request.51 In the case of a questioning only warrant, it must require the named 
person to appear before a prescribed authority52 for questioning under the warrant 
                                                    
47 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), s 34C, including requirements for the draft equest: see s 34C (2). 
48 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C (3)(a) (b) and (c). The Attorney General must also, under s 34C (3)(ba) be 
satisfied that a range of adopting acts (listed under s 34C (3A)) relating to a written statement of proce-
dures (the protocol) have been completed. See also ‘ASIO Protocol To Guide Warrant Process’, Attor-
ney General’s News Release, 12 August 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_200> (1 November 
2004) and Parliament of Australia Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Protocol Tabled Paper 
319 of 2003 (2003). S 34C (3B) of the Act also requires that the Attorney General must ensure that a 
warrant to be requested for custody and detention permits the detainee (subject to s.34 TA) to contact a 
lawyer of the detainee’s choice after the detainee has been brought before a prescribed authority for 
questioning. 
49 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34AB enables the Attorney General to appoint as an issuing authority a con-
senting Federal magistrate or judge or a consenting person in a specified class declared by regulations t  
be an issuing authority. 
50 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D(1)(b). 
51 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D(2). 
52 A prescribed authority is a consenting person appointed by writing by the Minister who (1) has served 
as a judge in one or more of the superior courts fo a period of 5 years and no longer holds a commission 
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immediately after the person is notified of the issue of the warrant, or at a time 
specified in the warrant.53 In the case of a detention and questioning warrant, it must 
authorise the named person to be taken into custody immediately by a police offi-
cer, brought before a prescribed authority immediatly for questioning under the 
warrant and detained under arrangements made by a police officer for the question-
ing period.54  
 
Both forms of warrants are governed by section 34HB of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) 
providing for a regime of a maximum of 24 hours of questioning55 in three eight 
hour blocks of questioning in the presence of the prescribed authority. After each 
cumulation of eight hours of questioning, the prescibed authority, on application of 
a person exercising authority under the warrant, may only permit the questioning to 
continue if satisfied that: 
 
(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that permitting the con-
tinuation will substantially assist the collection f intelligence that 
is important in relation to a terrorism offence; and 
(b) persons exercising authority under the warrant co ducted the 
questioning of the person properly and without delay in the period 
mentioned in that subsection56 
 
Section 34 HC requires that a person cannot be detained under a warrant for a 
continuous period of more than 168 hours, although a capacity exists to obtain 
second and subsequent warrants on not especially onerous additional grounds.57 The 
proposal of the Law Council of Australia that a further five requirements58 need be 
satisfied before a second or subsequent warrant be approved was not accepted by 
the Parliament, so that the legislation ‘will subject some of our fellow citizens to 
both interrogation and administrative detention for long and repeated periods’.59 
 
                                                                                                                       
as a judge of a superior court or (2) if satisfied that there are an insufficient number of retired juges to 
act as prescribed authorities, appoint a person who is currently serving as a judge in a State or Territory 
Supreme Court or District Court (or an equivalent) and has done so for a period of at least 5 years or (3) 
if satisfied that there are an insufficient number of etired judges or currently serving State or Territo y 
judges to act as prescribed authorities, appoint an AAT President or Deputy President who is enrolled as 
a legal practitioner of a federal court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory and has been enroll d 
for at least 5 years: ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34B (1) to (3). 
53 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34C (3)(a) (b) and (c). 
54 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D (2) (b) (i). 
55 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB (6) states that persons exercising authority under a s.34 D warrant must 
not question a person under the warrant if the person has been questioned under the warrant for a total of 
24 hours. 
56 Section 34 HB (4) (a) and (b) of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth). 
57 Aside from the s 34D (1)(b) requirement, the issuing authority must take account of the requirements 
of the person already having been detained in connection with one or more warrants: ASIO Act 1979 
(Cth) s.34D (1A) (a), (b)(i) and (ii). 
58 The five additional requirements are listed in Dunca  Kerr, ‘Australia’s legislative response to Terror-
ism’, Paper delivered to the Criminal Bar Association of Victoria, 26 August 2003, 5. 
59 Kerr, above n 58, 5. 
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Several other features of the detention and questioning regime importantly confirm 
its draconian scope. Detention is incommunicado, in the sense that the subject of the 
warrant, who may not be suspected of any terrorism offence but may simply be 
thought to have relevant information, can disappear from the community for one 
week. A close examination of the legislation confirms that during this time there is 
no enforceable right of a detainee to notify family members or employers of one’s 
whereabouts.60  Such concessions to discretionary communication61 with the outside 
world are subject to a range of contingencies.62   
 
A person appearing before a prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant 
has the right of silence63 and privilege against self-incrimination64 removed. Use 
immunity in criminal proceedings of this information and records and things pro-
duced whilst before a prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant is pro-
vided,65 but not derivative use immunity. 
 
Similarly, there are also significant restrictions on the role of lawyers during deten-
tion.66 The incommunicado model of the detention is underlin d in the fact that the 
legislative drafting fails to create an explicit right for a lawyer to be present at all 
times during detention and questioning,67 providing an ambiguity which may effec-
tively exclude continuous legal representation and presence.68 
 
Initially, limitations may be imposed upon the direction of the prescribed authority, 
relating to contact with a particular lawyer, on the basis of certain adverse circum-
stances relating to that lawyer would eventuate.69 A range of further limitations also 
exists. Contact between a person subject to the warrant and his or her legal adviser 
                                                    
60  ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F (8).  
61 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34F (9). 
62 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s.34 D (2) (b) (ii) requires that a detentio warrant issued by the issuing authority 
must, only in the most general and unspecific terms, ‘permit the person to contact identified persons at 
specified times when the person is in custody or detention authorised by the warrant’.  The requirement 
of ‘specified times’ is open to the specification of a contingency having the effect of preventing commu-
nication with the outside world. Similarly, s 34D (4) states that the ‘warrant may identify someone whom 
the person is permitted to contact by reference to the fact that he or she…has a particular legal or familial 
relationship with the person…’.  Whilst the person is before the prescribed authority for questioning 
under a warrant, the authority may give (d) a direction permitting the person to contact an identified 
person (including someone identified by reference to the fact that he or she has a particular legal or 
familial relationship with the person) or any person: s 34F (1)(d). Such a direction by the prescribed 
authority must be consistent with the warrant or be approved in writing by the Minister: s 34F (2). 
63 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G (3). 
64 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G (6). 
65 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s.34G (9) (a) and (b). 
66 Section 34 C (3B) requires that the drafting of the warrant for detention include provision to permit the 
detainee to contact a single lawyer of the person’s choice. 
67 The legislation consistently refers to ‘contact’ with a lawyer: see s 34C (3B), 34D (4) and (4A), 34TA 
(1), (2) and (4), s 34 U (1) and (2). Significantly, s 34 TB (1) states ‘To avoid doubt, a person before a 
prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant issued under section 34D may be questioned under 
the warrant in the absence of a lawyer of the person’s choice’. 
68 Contrast the ambivalent situation relating to the pr sence of legal representation with the presence of 
the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security under the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HAB and see also 
Hocking, above n 17, 229. 
69 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34TA (2) lists these circumstances. 
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must be made in a way that can be monitored by a person exercising authority under 
the warrant.70 A legal adviser may not intervene in questioning of the person subject 
to the warrant or address the prescribed authority during questioning, except to 
request clarification of an ambiguous answer.71 Should the prescribed authority 
consider the legal adviser’s conduct is unduly disrupting the questioning, the pre-
scribed authority is able to direct removal of the legal adviser from the place where 
the questioning is occurring.72 Provisions which created general prohibitions of 
certain communications by legal advisers relating to the questioning or detention of 
the subject in the original version of the legislation have been repealed73 and re-
placed with new offences74 distinguishing between information disclosures befor  
the expiry of a warrant75 and information disclosures in the two years after the 
expiry of the warrant,76 including the application of strict liability provisions to 
lawyers77 in relation to specified elements of these offences. The application of 
strict liability provisions to lawyers is a practical and symbolic toughening of ex-
ecutive attitude to the operation of questioning and detention warrants. 
 
The significance of the above provisions in their application to non-suspects is as 
much practical as it is symbolic and normative. The removal of the need to demon-
strate culpability or involvement in terrorism offences as a precondition for the 
exercise of a warrant is of transformative significan e in relations between the 
citizen and the state.78 It is a significant shift towards maximal state characteristics, 
particularly in the removal or diminution of procedural rights and protections. The 
breaching of the non-suspect threshold is likely to be exponential and facilitate 
further executive claims, such as those made by the A torney-General, to erode 
democratic protections. The likelihood of such claims is heightened as the non-state 
terrorist threat is unpredictable, unknown, inevitable and indefinite.79   
 
                                                    
70 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 U (2). 
71 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 U (4). 
72 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 U (5). 
73 See ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) s 8 repealing ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) subsections 34U 
(7), (8), (9), (10) and (11). 
74 A more detailed discussion of these provisions follows below under the sub-heading ‘ASIO Legisla-
tion Amendment Act 2003 (Cth)’. 
75  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (1). 
76  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (2). 
77  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (3). 
78  In that the entire population is now potentially subject to intelligence gathering and surveillance, with 
consequences for release from intelligence gathering detention: see Hocking, above n 17, 233. The 
slippage of language and labelling from persons whomay reasonably be thought to have information in 
relation to terrorism offences, into the categories of terrorist suspects themselves, indicates this pe-
nomenon. In this context, see the comments about terrorist suspects and terrorists:  House of Represen-
tatives, Hansard, 24 June 2004, 30562 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
79  See Hocking, above n 17, 233. 
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III RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE EXECUTIVE CLAIMS                          
FOR ENHANCED POWER  
 
Such developments have fostered an environment where t  Attorney General can 
argue that the Senate’s amendment of the original bill for ASIO detention and 
questioning powers produced inferior legislation,80 with the circumstances of the 
Brigitte deportation justifying various amendments to Part II, Divisions 2 and 3 of 
the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), only passed by the Senate in June 2003.81  
 
A ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) 
The process of enlarging executive power has proceeded apace. The ASIO Legisla-
tion Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) was introduced into the Parliament on 27 Novem-
ber 200382 and passed a mere eight days later on 5 December 2003 without 
amendment and without reference to a parliamentary committee.83 The bill made 
several significant changes far in excess of their misleading description as ‘techni-
cal amendments’.84 It clearly reflects the modus operandi of crisis and urgency in 
national security amendments cultivated by the Attorney General85 and government.  
 
The amendments enable ASIO to question persons where ‘an interpreter is present 
at any time while a person is questioned under a warrant issued under section 
34D’86 for a total of six eight hour blocks in a 168 hour detention.87 It further re-
                                                    
80 Philip Ruddock, ‘The Commonwealth Response to September 11: The Rule of Law and National 
Security’, Speech at Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law – National Forum on the War on Terrorism 
and the Rule of Law, New South Wales Parliament House, 10 November 2003- describing the outcome 
as possibly ‘third or fourth best’:  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Alldocs/RWPA8C31B13B5C> (17 November 
2003). 
See also House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21973-21974, stating ‘…when you 
endeavour to put in place checks and balances, the checks can outweigh the balances. That is what I 
think can happen…Certain powers not being used becaus  people formed the view that they could not be 
used with certainty - and that is clear from the advice that was given by ASIO’s head to the Senate 
estimates committee’ (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
81 The June 2003 amendments were made by the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 
(Cth). The ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) was subsequently amended in December 2003 by the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Act 2003 (Cth), which is discussed immediately below. 
82 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 27 November 2003, 22885. 
83 See Senate, Hansard, 4 December 2003, 18798. 
84 The “technical” description by the Opposition misstates the nature of the amendment. It appears 
intended to avoid a politically damaging but principled amendment of the provisions: see House of 
Representatives, Hansard, 2 December 2003, 23119 (Robert McClelland) and Senate, Hansard, 3 
December 2003, 18354 (Senator Hon John Faulkner). Se the criticisms of this ‘technical’ description by 
Senator Bob Brown: Senate, Hansard, 3 December 2003, 18357 and 18358 and Senate, Hansard, 4 
December 2003, 18785 and 18789.  
85  This method will be the subject of further discussion below. 
86  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB (8). 
87  See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB (9) to (12). 
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quires the surrender of passports by a person subject to a warrant under s.34D88 and 
creates an offence of leaving Australia without the permission of the Director Gen-
eral of ASIO after a person has been notified of the issue of a warrant under s.34D 
and before the end of period specified in the warrant during which the warrant is to 
be in force.89 The capacity of the prescribed authority to make an order authorising 
detention of a person during the course of a questioning only warrant is confirmed 
by the inclusion of s.34F (2A). 
 
Extensive provisions also prohibit the disclosure of information relating to warrants 
and questioning both before the expiry of the warrant90 and in the two years after 
the expiry of the warrant.91 These disclosure offences include unauthorised primary 
and secondary disclosures of an extensive range of information. The effect of these 
provisions is to criminalise media reporting of material within the broad terms of 
the prohibitions, including reporting of the fact tha  a detention and questioning 
warrant has been issued in relation to a specific matter. 
 
These provisions will dramatically curtail public acountability of the application 
and operation of the detention and questioning warrants which reporting would 
instigate, as well as chill potential publication where legal questions arise about the 
scope of the legislation’s disclosure offences. Consequently, the Attorney General 
becomes the source of authorised disclosures of infrmation on the operation of the 
warrants, able to control debate and accountability through selective release of 
information and invoking ‘operational matters’ as a rationalisation for declining 
further disclosure. Unsuccessful attempts were made to amend the bill to protect 
media disclosures of matters relating to detention and questioning warrants by 
applying a series of criteria, including that a public interest test be satisfied, and that 
national security not be threatened.92 
 
The amendments are also likely to produce ripple eff cts in the strengthening of 
executive influence over detention and interrogative powers. The exclusion of 
                                                    
88 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34HB (9) to (12). The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 3) 2004 (Cth) extended the 
requirement to surrender Australian and foreign pass orts to earlier situations where the Director 
General of ASIO has merely sought the Attorney-General’s consent to request the issue of a warrant for 
questioning and/or detention: See Anti-Terrorism Act (No 3) 2004 (Cth) Schedule 2, clause 34 JBA. 
89 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34JD (1)(a) to (d) and (2). 
90 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (1) (a) to (f). This involves disclosure of information where either 
of both (i) the information indicates the fact that the warrant has been issued or a fact relating to the 
content of the warrant or to the questioning or detention of a person in connection with the warrant or (ii) 
the information is operational information (providing the person disclosing that information has the 
information as a direct or indirect result of (i) the issue of the warrant or (ii) the doing of anything 
authorised by the warrant, by a direction given under subsection 34F(1) in connection with the warrant or 
by another provision…in connection with the warrant, wi h the disclosure occurring before the end of the 
period for which the warrant is to be in force and the disclosure is not a permitted disclosure. 
91 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (2) (a) to (f). These disclosures deal with operational information 
and the discloser has the information as a direct or indirect result of (i) the issue of the warrant or (ii) the 
doing of anything authorised by the warrant, by a direction given under subsection 34F (1) in connection 
with the warrant or by another provision of this Divis on in connection with the warrant…and the 
disclosure is not a permitted disclosure. 
92 See Senate, Hansard, 4 December 2003, 18791-18797. 
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media reporting will curtail the availability of information and chill reporting of 
alleged improprieties and illegalities, removing a deterrent for abuse of power, 
diminishing literacy about case and policy issues, easing the passage of incremental 
diminutions of civil rights through serial amendments to the legislation, whilst 
depriving public and professional groups from important information necessary to 
make comprehensive submissions to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelli-
gence Services prior to expiry of the legislation under the sunset clause.93  This 
creation of an artificial situation, with the appearance of a successful, but untested, 
operation of the new intelligence gathering powers, will further constrain a critical 
and deliberative role for the Opposition and minor pa ties in additional reforms.  
 
This suppression of media reporting under the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 
2003 (Cth) compounds two previously identified rule of law problems emerging 
with the conferral of detention and questioning powers on a secret organisation, 
whilst adding further secrecy dimensions. In the first nstance, distinct accountabil-
ity problems emerge when intelligence gathering is extended to incorporate police-
like powers. As Williams observed: 
 
If ASIO is to be granted coercive police powers, the Bill must subject the 
organisation to the same political and community scrutiny and controls 
that apply to any other police force. However, thisis not compatible with 
the current intelligence gathering work of ASIO and its organisational 
structure (such as the secrecy applying to the identity of its employees). It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for ASIO both o be sufficiently se-
cretive to adequately fulfil its primary mission, as well as to be sufficiently 
open to scrutiny to exercise the powers set out in the ASIO bill.94 
 
These additional layers of secrecy will suppress further already limited opportuni-
ties for scrutiny and accountability, particularly in relation to the formation of 
public and political opinion deriving from reporting, but also constraining the 
volume of publicly available information against which the Inspector General of 
Intelligence and Security,95 the Commonwealth Ombudsman96 and the Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee on Intelligence Services97 can conduct their review functions. 
 
                                                    
93 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 Y – Division 3 of Part III of the Act ceases to have effect 3 years after it 
commences. Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bb) requires that the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Intelligence Services review by 22 January 2006 (i) Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act 
1979 (Cth); and (ii) the amendments made by the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, 
except item 24 of Schedule 1 to that Act (which included ASIO Act 1979 Division 3 of  Part III). 
94 George Williams, ‘One Year On: Australia’s legal response to September 11’ (2002) 27 Alternative 
Law Journal 212, 214-215. See also Hocking, above n 17, 224 and Joo Cheong Tham, ‘ASIO and the 
Rule of Law’ (2002) 27 Alternative Law Journal 216, 217. 
95 See Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) and ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) ss  
34HAB, 34 HA, 34NC and 34 Q. 
96 See Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 (Cth) Part III and the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s  
34NC. 
97 See Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) Part 4  ss 28 to 32 and Schedule 1, Part 1A, Part 1 and Part 2. 
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Secondly, further layers of secrecy suppressing public reporting will enlarge the 
scope of ASIO discretionary powers98 under its charter, especially the circum-
stances in which warrants are sought99 and the conditions and duration of question-
ing and detention.100 Generalised media reporting may have appraised issues uch 
as predictability and consistency in the use of discretions under the warrants and the 
effectiveness of legislative safeguards in controlling the operation of those discre-
tions. Again, this suppression of information will be detrimental to the operation of 
the legislation’s accountability mechanisms. 
 
Further effects will flow in relation to access to judicial review. Strict liability 
provisions,101 creating a reverse onus of proof on the balance of probabilities, apply 
to the character and identity of information102 forming the basis of the information 
disclosure offence applicable to lawyers.103 The tightening of obligations on a 
detainee’s lawyer not to disclose information obtained during ASIO interrogations 
will, in the context of the severe constraints on legal representation during interro-
gation,104 including regulations about communication by legal advisers of informa-
tion relating to a person specified in a warrant105 and lawyers’ access to information 
for proceedings relating to a warrant,106 further impede effective legal representa-
tion in accessing remedies in the courts in the casof individual detainees. 
 
The amendments are also significant in their constitutional dimension. Questions as 
to the constitutionality of the suppression of information about and reporting of 
detention and questioning warrants were not raised n the Parliamentary debates, 
with the residual treatment in the legislation of the impact of the implied freedom of 
political communication107 repeating the casual attitude to the constitutional ty of 
the original legislation.108 The tendency of the amendments to suppress information 
                                                    
98 For a discussion of some issues relating to ASIO’s discretionary powers, see Tham, above n 94, 217-
218. 
99 Most significantly, in the formulation of the opinio  that a detention warrant is required based on the 
elements of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 C (3)(c). 
100 In the application of the ASIO Questioning Protocol made pursuant to subsection 34C ( A), setting 
basic standards in relation to the detention and questioning of a person pursuant to a warrant issued under 
the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D and particularly in relation to s.34HB (3) requests to the prescribed 
authority by a person exercising authority under th warrant to permit the questioning to continue aftr 
intervals of 8 hours and 16 hours. 
101 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (3) applying to paragraphs (1)(c) and (2)(c) of s 34VAA. 
102 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (1)(c) and 2(c). 
103 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (3)(b)(i) to (iii). A ‘lawyer’ comprises those who have at any time 
been (i) present, as the subject’s legal adviser, at the questioning of the subject under the warrant (ii) 
contacted for the purpose of the subject obtaining legal advice in connection with the warrant; or (iii) 
contacted for the purpose of the subject obtaining representation in legal proceedings seeking a remedy 
relating to the warrant or the treatment of the subject in connection with the warrant. 
104 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) ss 34TA, 34TB and 34U. The observations of Sydne  lawyer Adam Houda 
representing clients believed to be the first interrogated under the provisions are mentioned in an article 
by Freya Petersen, ‘Fears ASIO laws a threat to freedoms’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 December 2003. 
105 See ASIO Amendment Regulations 2003 (Cth) (No 1) Regulation 3A. 
106 See ASIO Amendment Regulations 2003 (Cth) (No 1) Regulation 3B. 
107 ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) s 34VAA (12). 
108 See the discussion of this point under the sub-heading ‘Executive review: revisiting or reworking an 
earlier legislative ambit claim?’ which follows. 
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and frustrate accountability may be seen as part of an interlocking array of prohibi-
tions of disclosures of security related operations, capabilities, methods and 
sources109 with espionage offences.110 
 
B Prospective change: liberalising the criteria for             
obtaining detention and questioning warrants 
To complement the suppression of reporting and information about detention and 
questioning warrants under the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth), the 
most significant change suggested by the Attorney Gneral is an expansion of the 
grounds for the granting and duration of the warrants. From the Brigitte incident, 
the Attorney General has cultivated adverse comparisons between the detention and 
questioning powers under the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) with those available to the 
French authorities,111 suggesting that the decision not to obtain an ASIO detention 
and questioning warrant for Brigitte was largely based on issues as to whether the 
necessary legal tests, under the existing warrant procedures,112 could be satisfied.113  
 
The existing warrant process was previously seen as affording positive preliminary 
safeguards114 to the use of exceptional detention and questioning powers.115 Instead, 
                                                    
109 See the array of espionage and similar activity offences concerning the security or defence of the 
Commonwealth under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 91.1.  Under Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 
90.1, ‘security or defence of a country includes the operations, capabilities and technologies of, and
methods and sources used by, the country’s intelligence or security agencies’. In close similarity, 
‘operational information’ in the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) s 34VAA (5) comprises (a) 
information that ASIO has or had; (b) a source of information…that ASIO has or had and (c) an opera-
tional capability, method or plan of ASIO. 
110 See Michael Head, ‘‘Counter-Terrorism’ Laws: A Threat to Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and 
Constitutional Rights’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 666, 674. Controversial measures to 
control the production and protect national security information in trials have been introduced to Parlia-
ment: see National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) and the National 
Security Information (Criminal Proceedings)(Consequntial Amendments) Bill 2004 (Cth) and refer to 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and Security 
Sensitive Information, Report 98 (2004). 
111 With emphasis upon a capacity to detain terrorist su pects for up to three years while a case able to b
prosecutable case is assembled, with the investigating judge merely having to make a determination that
the detainee is able to assist with inquiries: see Ruddock, above n 1;  Ruddock, ‘Intelligence delay hs 
Ruddock asking questions’ above n 12;  Ruddock, ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’, above n 12;  Tom 
Allard, ‘ASIO needs new powers: Ruddock’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 2003; ‘New anti-
terrorism laws too cumbersome: Ruddock’, ABC Online 10 November 2003  
<http:www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/n> (21 November  
2003); ‘Interview transcript CNN Interview: Ruddock Discusses Guantanamo Bay Detainees and  
Counter-Terrorism Legislation’ 11 November 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministerruddockhome:nsf/Web+Pages/481817735CFD5> (17 November  
2003).  
112 See the discussion of the procedure for obtaining questioning and detention warrants under the 
heading ‘ASIO Questioning and Detention Powers: A synopsis’, above. 
113 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 3 November 2003 21727-21728, 21729 (Hon Philip Rud-
dock) and Ruddock, ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’, above n 12.       
114  Refer to discussion under the sub-heading ‘The warrant detention and questioning powers’, above. 
115 Especially as they may be applied to persons entirely nnocent of any involvement in terrorism 
offences, but whom may be thought to have information. 
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the present Attorney General characterised, in a comparative context,116 the proce-
dures as substantially obstructing intelligence work.117 This appraisal is even more 
extraordinary, firstly as the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) detention and questioning powers 
were not used in the questioning of Brigitte prior t  deportation and moreover, the 
questioning powers were used successfully in follow up investigations to the 
Brigitte incident.118 Moreover, the s.34D warrant request procedure complained of 
by the Attorney General is actually a clause drafted by the Government, which 
appeared in the original Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill first introduced on 21 March 2002.119 The clause survived un-
changed the many amendments made to the bill in the Senate.120 This unaltered 
clause was itself significantly broader in its scope than was contemplated in the 
months preceding introduction of the bill.121    
 
This push for further liberalisation of warrant powers provides sharp insights into 
the evolving Australian relationship between civil rights and national security 
imperatives, with the former increasingly vulnerable to attrition as the supposed 
‘balance’ in legislation is repeatedly contested anpolitical opportunities are acted 
upon.  This attrition is accelerated in that the constant focus is upon liberalising 
executive power relating to counter-terrorism measure , rather than a more effective 
utilisation of existing powers, as well as refining intelligence analysis, resources 
and communication.122 Whilst no cogent argument for liberalising already extraor-
dinary warrant powers has been established, the excptionality of such measures 
appears to have evaporated from the public debate. Th  Attorney General’s com-
plaint about an unnecessarily high approval threshold for the issue a warrant does 
                                                    
116 However, and in complete contradiction, procedures have been positively cited elsewhere under the 
heading of ‘Transparency and Accountability of ASIO Powers’: Ruddock, above n 80. 
117 Some examples are the ‘very high level of supervision to the security agency when it undertakes to 
use those powers…quite significant limitations on the extent to which the powers can be used’: Rud-
dock, above n 1; ‘The powers that have been quite sev rely circumscribed by the Senate in terms of the 
way in which they are able to operate’: Ruddock, ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’ above n 12; ‘[S]ometimes 
there are trade offs. And we are in a position where we possibly have an outcome that is third or fourth 
best…There are issues associated with criteria under which a person may be questioned’:  Ruddock ‘The 
Commonwealth Response to September 11: The Rule of Law and National Security’ above n 80.        . 
118 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21951 (Hon Simon Crean). 
119 See A-G’s Press Release ‘ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill Introduced’ 21 March 2002. 
120 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 21731 and 4 November 2003, 21854 
(Robert McClelland). 
121 See A-G’s Press Release ‘New Counter-Terrorism Measures’ 2 October 2001  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_200 > (1 November  
2004) confining the proposed powers to ‘politically motivated violence’. See also Report of Australia to 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 Septemb r 2001 (First Australian report to the UN 
Counter-Terrorism Committee), United Nations document S/2001/1247, 10; and James Renwick, ‘The 
War Against Terrorism, National Security and the Constitution’ (2002-2003) Bar News: Journal of the 
NSW Bar Association 42, 47, quoting Brett Walker SC. 
122 See Williams, above n 94, 215. 
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suggest a politicised role in administering the present measures.123  A loosening of 
those warrant criteria would increase the risks of uch politicisation.  
 
 
C Executive review: revisiting or reworking an earlier      
legislative ambit claim? 
Following the Brigitte incident and consistent with a model of strong executive 
control and the marginalisation of broader democratic contributions, the Attorney-
General’s department has been entrusted with an undisclosed departmental review 
of the legislation.124 An interest and opportunity therefore arises to revisit and 
repackage the most draconian characteristics of the original and subsequent ver-
sions of the ASIO Legislation (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), rejected by the Senate 
and heavily criticised in three Parliamentary Committee reports.125 A survey of the 
original bill’s content will provide insights into why this present form of depart-
mental review is unacceptable and how, in keeping with official comments from the 
Brigitte incident, will almost certainly find deficiencies with the existing legislation.   
 
The original bill was a deeply flawed document undermining accepted rule of law 
procedural presumptions and standards of democratic accountability.126 It contained 
many drafting errors and ellipses and serially excised fundamental legal rights.127 
The original bill nominated members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
lacking independence from the Executive and security of tenure, in the role of 
prescribed authorities.128 Indefinite detention was feasible, through a serie of 
renewable 48 hour warrants129 and no right of access to legal representation ex-
isted.130 The bill did not require that a person taken into custody pursuant to a 
warrant be brought before a prescribed authority immediately for questioning.131 
                                                    
123 See Michael Head, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws Threaten Fu damental Democratic Rights’ (2002) 27 
Alternative Law Journal 121, 122, asserting the highly political character of these measures. See also 
Daryl Williams, ‘The Role of the Attorney-General’ (2002) 13 Public Law Review, 252, 261-262. 
124 See Ruddock, above n 80; see also ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’, above n 12 and Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 145 (Senate Estimates). In 
contrast, the review in the United Kingdom of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), by 
a nine member Privy Counsellor review committee was conducted over the extended  period of 20 
months: see Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: 
Report (2003). 
125 See An Advisory Report on the Australian Security and Itelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002, above n 44;  Provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence L gislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002, above n 44; and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters, above n 44.     
126 Legal representation was excluded. Other more extraordinary aspects of the bill are discussed imme-
diately below. 
127  Hocking, above n 17, 215-217 surveys the most extreme provisions. 
128 ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 Clauses 34B (1)(b)(i) to (iv)  (original version of 
bill). 
129 Clauses 34C (5) (a) and (b) and 34D (2)(b)(i) (original version of bill). 
130 Clause 34D (4) (original version of bill). 
131 Evidenced by the wording of Clause 34D (2) (b) (i) of the original version of the bill ‘authorise a 
specified person to be immediately taken into custody by a police officer, brought before a prescribed 
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This omission would have allowed extended detention for the 28 day duration of the 
warrant.132 The treatment of the person during detention and questioning was left 
almost wholly unregulated,133 with no protocols or a statement of procedures gov-
erning the rights of detainees included within, or requiring implementation, by 
regulation or tabled document. No use immunity for information provided by de-
tainees during questioning was provided under the bill, 134 producing the remarkable 
situation where it may have been preferable for a det inee to refuse to provide the 
information sought during the intelligence gathering terrogation, and face a pen-
alty of five years imprisonment,135 rather than face a heavier penalty upon convic-
tion for a terrorism offence from information obtained during an act of self-
incrimination.  
 
Other alarming features characterised the bill. No offence or penalty was prescribed 
for officials who breached their obligations under the bill, most importantly in 
relation to the treatment and welfare of the detaine.136 Children of any age could be 
detained under the bill without the knowledge of their parents or guardian,137 and 
strip searches conducted on children as young as ten years old.138 The unremarked 
casualness which all of these measures encroached upon f ndamental rights is 
perhaps best confirmed in the fact that no sunset clause existed in the bill, to under-
line its temporary and exceptional nature.139 Similarly, there was no provision for 
reporting the number of warrants issued for questioning and detention.140 
 
In tabling the report of the bill, the Chair of the bi-partisan Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD stated that ‘The proposed legislation, in its 
                                                                                                                       
authority for questioning under the warrant and detained under arrangements made by a police officer for 
a specified period of not more than 48 hours starting when the person is brought before the authority’. 
132 See Clause 34D (6) (b) of the original version of the bill stated ‘Also, the warrant must (b) specify the 
period during which the warrant is to be in force, which must not be more than 28 days’. 
133 Clause 34 J of the original bill provided the unenforceable statement ‘(2) The person must be treated 
with humanity and with respect for human dignity, and must not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, by anyone exercising authority under the warrant or implementing or enforcing the 
direction.’ 
134 Clause 34G (8) of the original bill stated that ‘For the purposes of subsections (3) [information 
requested] and (6) [record or thing], the person may not fail: (a) to give information; or (b) to produce a 
record or thing; in accordance with a request made of the person in accordance with the warrant, on the 
ground that the information, or production of the record or thing, might tend to incriminate the person or 
make the person liable to a penalty.’ Clause 34 G (9) of the original bill created exceptions as to the
admissibility in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings other than proceedings for an 
offence against this section or a terrorism offence.  
135 As prescribed by the clauses of the original bill:C auses 34G(3) and 34G(6). 
136 That is, no penalty attached to a breach of Clause 34 J, discussed above under the heading ‘Executive 
review: revisiting or reworking an earlier legislative ambit claim?’ 
137 In other words, the incommunicado form of detentio was extended indiscriminately to adults and 
children: see Clause 34F(8) of the original version of the bill. 
138 Clause 34 M (1)(e) of the original version of the bill. 
139 The inclusion of a sunset clause terminating the legis ation three years from the date of its com-
mencement was recommended in A  Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intellig nce Organisa-
tion Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 above n 44, xvi (Recommendation 12). 
140 The inclusion by ASIO in its declassified Annual Report of the total number of warrants issued under 
the Act was recommended in An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intellig nce Organisation 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 above n 44, xvi (Recommendation 11). 
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original form, would undermine key legal rights and erode the civil liberties that 
make Australia a leading democracy’.141 A significant proportion of the criticism of 
the legislation by members of the Opposition related to the extraordinary and un-
checked scope of the provisions of the original bill.142 
 
Concerns about the nature of the ongoing internal review by the department are 
reinforced by earlier inadequacies in defending the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion.143 The approach by the department to the legislation before the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional References Committee appeared to minimise ventilation of its 
constitutionality, with the paucity and quality of the constitutional advice attracting 
the censure of the Committee Chair.144 It was observed in both a submission to the 
Committee145 and by the Committee itself,146 that the legislation’s constitutionality 
had been inadequately addressed by the department.147 The approach might be 
explained in risk appraisal terms, as litigation would need to test the legislation’s 
constitutionality.148 Such a risk appraisal, giving insufficient attentio  to legality, is 
inimical to the rule of law.  
 
The Attorney-General’s departmental review of the detention and questioning 
powers signals an emerging trend to treat detailed parliamentary process as but a 
temporary impediment to government mandated executive outcomes,149 producing 
an increasingly restricted and contingent quality of democracy. These erosions of 
democratic principle are reinforced by the exclusion of public participation through 
                                                    
141 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 June 2002 P 2846 (Hon David Jull, Chair of Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD). 
142 See, for example statements by Senator John Faulkner Senate, Hansard, 17 June 2003 11566 and 
11568 and Senate, Hansard, 18 June 2003 11677 and 11678; Senator Robert Ray Senate, Hansard, 25 
June 2003, 12194 and Daryl  Melham House of Representatives, Hansard, 12 December 2002, 10432 
and 5 November 2003 21968-21969. 
143 The Attorney-General’s department asserted that the A torney General was satisfied that the bill was 
constitutional: Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 12 November 2002, 
10-11.  
144 See Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 12 November 2002, 19-20; 13 
November 2002, 48 and 26 November 2002, 281. It was established that the only advice as to the 
constitutionality of the bill had been obtained from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel and the Austra-
lian Government Solicitor: Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 26 No-
vember 2002, 281. 
145 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 22 November 2002, 147, 154 (Dr 
Gavan Griffith QC) 
146 See Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and 
related matters, above n 44, 23 and Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 26 
November 2002, 281. 
147 This point might be reasonably deducted from an answer by the Attorney-General’s Department to a 
question on notice in November 2002 from the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee: 
Attorney-General’s Department Information and Security Law Division Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee Answers to Questions on Notice – Attorney-General’s Department, 1 (undated 
document). 
148 The lack of automaticity regarding unconstitutionality of the legislation and the need for the matter o 
go to court was explicitly mentioned in the evidenc of the Attorney-General’s Department: see Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 26 November 2002, 281. 
149 See Hocking, above n 17, 223. 
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submissions to a parliamentary inquiry,150 a method more likely to test government 
claims, develop substantive safeguards and ventilate and deliberate expert submis-
sions and public concerns. 
 
D Executive control: original Ministerial conceptions 
With only four months and a change of Attorneys General151 between the passage 
of the exceptional detention and questioning provisi ns and the impetus of the 
Brigitte incident for further extension of powers and relaxation of their safeguards, 
identifying features of the executive response in the passage of the legislation also 
provides insight into the rationales of the ongoing reform claims. 
 
Some distinctive executive characteristics emerge. Firstly, Attorney-General Wil-
liams portrayed the Government’s approach as one of r sponsibility, determination 
in parliamentary negotiations, balance and reasonable ess in advancing a workable 
bill to protect community safety152 and enable ASIO to ‘get on with the job of 
protecting Australians and Australian interests’.153 In contrast, Senate and Opposi-
tion party amendments were criticised as being irresponsible, intransigent, unwork-
able and political point scoring exercises.154 
                                                    
150 A further example of the distaste for such inquiries was apparent in relation to the Anti-Terrorism Bill 
(No.3) 2004 (Cth): see House of Representatives, Hansard,  24 June 2004, 30562. Similarly, the essential 
and democratic Parliamentary process of referral of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2004 (Cth) to the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee for scrutiny was considered as ‘delaying tac-
tics…potentially adding months to the process’: A-G’s  Press Release 8 July 2004  ‘Labor Delays 
Important Anti-Terrorism Legislation’  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Web+Pages/4567DEEBC91726A4CA256E> 
(8 July 2004).  
151 The Hon Daryl Williams AM QC MP was Commonwealth Attorney General until 6 October 2003 
and was succeeded by the Hon Philip Ruddock on 7 October 2003. 
152 See A-G’s Press Releases ‘Compromise For The Sake Of National Security’ 11 June 2003 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Web+Pages/D7604110820D9D> (12 June 2003);  
‘ASIO Bill A Win For National Security’ 17 June 2003 
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/3D53E6D7167849> (18 June 2003)   
‘Stronger Tools For ASIO To Combat Terrorism’ 26 June 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/24D4E5BFA8A86> (29 June 2003) 
 and ‘Final passage Of ASIO Powers Legislation’ 26 June 2003 
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages?E8A8FB88011F66> (29 June 
 2003). 
153 See A-G’s Press Release ‘ASIO Bill A Win For National Security’ 17 June 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/3D53E6D7167849> (18 June 2003).  
154 See A-G’s Press Releases: ‘Labor Refuses to Engage on Community Safety’ 19 September 2002  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/47134D2C2037DF> (19 September 
2002) ‘ASIO Bill In Limbo’ 17 October 2002 
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/3A6A9D2ED0B12> (21 November 
2003); ‘Labor Chooses Delay Over Action On Terrorism’ 21 October 2002  
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/52612A10FC0DD  (21 November 
2003) ; ‘Labor Rejects Vital Counter-Terrorist Laws’ 13 December 2002 http://  
<152.91.15.12/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/8E05313A4C92A04BC> (11 January 2003) 
and ‘Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill House 
Message’ 13 December 2002 
 <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/41A0B86D7B465>  (21 November 
2003). 
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Further official comments supporting the bill were intended to persuade that in-
communicado detention and questioning powers directed against non-suspects were 
truly exceptional. Attorney General Williams observed ‘the bill is about intelligence 
gathering in extraordinary circumstances’;155 that it ‘must be remembered that these 
warrants are a measure of last resort. It is anticipated that they will be used rarely 
and only in extreme circumstances’156 and ‘I hope that the powers under the legisla-
tion never have to be exercised’.157 Passage of the detention and questioning powers 
was seen as a triumph, producing effective and workable legislation, ‘giving ASIO 
the powers it needs to do its job properly’.158 The regime of three eight hour blocks 
of questioning during a one week detention was a government sponsored ‘compro-
mise’,159 significantly expanding the duration of detention under the original bill.160 
It substantially enlarged the Opposition proposal, which sought to structure a legis-
lative scheme around the somewhat contentious distinction between a questioning 
regime and a detention regime by proposing more limited blocks of questioning 
time.161 
 
E    Executive control: politicising a counter-terrorism response 
The present Attorney-General’s comments from the Brigitte incident confirm a shift 
to an overt, professionalised politicisation of counter-terrorism issues,162 confusing 
partisan political interests and advantage with the security of the nation. These 
comments reflect an attitude that such issues are exclusively the remit of the execu-
tive, with non-government parliamentary or public contributions to the debate of 
                                                    
155 A-G’s Press Release ‘Australian Security Intelligenc  Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terror-
ism) Bill House Message’, 13 December 2002, above n 154. 
156 Senate, Hansard, 13 May 2003, 10584 (Senator Ian Campbell); House of Representatives Hansard 20 
March 2003, 13172 (Hon Daryl Williams). 
157 ‘ASIO laws finally passed’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 2003. 
158 A-G’s Press Release ‘ASIO Bill A Win For National Security’ 17 June 2003.  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/3D53E6D7167849> (18 June 2003)  
159 See A-G’s Press Release ‘Compromise For The Sake of National Security’ 11 June 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Web+Pages/D7604110820D9D> (12 June 2003). 
160 From a 48 hour warrant, involving the detailed three stage process for renewal, to a single 168 hour 
warrant, with the capacity for further warrants providing certain, but not onerous conditions, were met: 
ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34 D (1A). 
161 References to the proposed Opposition scheme of four h urs of questioning, followed by two possible 
extensions of eight hours of questioning, applying to non-suspects are found in Senate, Hansard, 12 
December 2002, 8153-8154 (Senator Hon John Faulkner); House of Representatives, Hansard, 12 
December 2002, 10430-10431, 10533 and 10564 (Hon Simon Crean); House of Representatives, Han-
sard, 12 December 2002, 10435, 10569 (Hon Kim Beazley) and House of Representatives, Hansard, 12 
December 2002, 10535 (Daryl Melham). See also Kim Beazley, ‘ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terror-
ism) Bill 2002: A way forward’ (Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee), 
November 2002 and ‘Table summarising the progress of the main issues in the ASIO Bill’, Document 
released from office of Senator John Faulkner, 18 June 2003, identifying the key features of the Opposi-
tion model. 
162 A striking example of this is found in the Attorney-General’s second reading speech of the Anti-
Terrorism Bill (No.3) 2004 (Cth), House of Representatives, Hansard, 24 June 2004, 30562. 
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marginal utility.163 Eschewing public debate and scrutiny by Parliamentary commit-
tees and encouraging the Opposition to accede to excessive, hastily conceived 
measures to avoid a political backlash, induces inferior legislative conditions for a 
coherent counter-terrorism response.  It is a reinstatement of an ambit national 
security claim likely to be pursued by incremental measures.164 This elite, central-
ised executive control of national security response to terrorism is ultimately corro-
sive of the practices of participatory democracy and democratic institutions. 
 
Several factors surrounding the Brigitte incident evid nce this re-asserted executive 
control of national security issues. The rhetorical shift is amply demonstrated by the 
readiness to identify the legislative response to non-state terrorism with a war.165 
Invoking the language of war166 rationalises the sweeping aside of legal norms and 
niceties,167 justifying extreme measures as an instinctive legis ative expression of 
state survival,168 creating an expectation of precedence of, and deferenc  to, execu-
tive judgment. Its constitutional dimension invokes an expanded scope of the s.51 
(vi) Defence power169 and in emergency situations, the prerogative aspect of the 
s.61 Executive power.170 
 
Secondly, the Attorney General’s advocacy of detention and questioning warrant 
criteria reform a mere four months after the conclusion of eighteen months of 
exhaustive debate, three parliamentary committee reports highly critical of the 
government’s bill and extensive expert contribution is dismissive of the democratic 
                                                    
163 See Hocking, above n 17, 213 and Senate, Hansard, 12 August 2004, 26081 (Senator Kerry Nettle 
quoting Joo-Cheong Tham’s identification of a government 5 step technique of terrorism law change). 
See also Joo-Cheong Tham’s comment on this technique in the Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 
webdiary 30 March 2004.  
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/30/1080544481409.html?oneclick=true> (16 August 2004). 
164 This seriatum technique has already been foreshadowed and warned against in other terrorism law 
contexts: see Senate, Hansard, 7 November 2003, 16189 and 16826 (Senator Bob Brown) and 16825 
(Senator Brian Greig). 
165 See Ruddock, above n 80. The identification of the terrorist threat as a war is also raised in ‘Statement 
By The Attorney-General Philip Ruddock On National Security – Overseas Developments’, 19 February 
2004 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Web+Pages/5B8D376BE792B92CCA256> 
(23 February 2004)  attacking the Opposition for ‘its incoherent and patchy approach to Australia’s 
national security’. 
166 The word ‘war’ is used on no fewer than six occasion  under the heading ‘Advent of Terrorism’ in 
Ruddock, above n 80. The words ‘battle’ and ‘ally’ are also included in this extract. See also A-G’s Press 
Releases of 27 May 2004, ‘Attorney-General Rejects Amnesty Criticism’  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Web+Pages/16DB7F9B1AE0D267CA256E> 
(27 May 2004) and 26 February 2004 ‘British Counter-T rorism Options Examined’  
<http:www.ag.gov.au/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Web+Pages/C2295DCF7EC17EDCA256E> (7 
July 2004).  
167 ‘When it comes to the war against terrorism, many of the subtleties usually associated with the fair 
and even application of the rule of law are not neatly applied’: Ruddock, above n 80. 
168 See Hocking, above n 31, 359. 
169 See Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 278 (Dixon J); Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457, 
471-472 (Dixon J) and Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 253-255 
(Fullagar J). 
170 See Farvey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452 (Isaacs J). 
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contribution expended in that legislative process.171 Proposals other than genuine 
technical amendments will also pre-empt the important s feguard of a full biparti-
san review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of the detention and 
questioning powers to be conducted by early 2006 by the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Intelligence Services,172 prior to the operation of the three year 
sunset clause in the legislation.173  Piecemeal amendments of the kind suggested, 
made in an anxiety laden security atmosphere, without proper consultative and 
deliberative processes, will fail to integrate a consideration of rights with the claims 
of security.   
 
The underlying assumptions are that an Executive re-ass ssment of powers is unex-
ceptional and that ‘the new security environment’ demands a suspension by the 
Senate of critical judgment,174 speed in the passage of legislation175 and the provi-
sion of cosmetic safeguards as concessions to rule of law concerns. Broad discre-
tions and deference to Executive judgment in the legislation is considered essential, 
as such judgment must be readily exercisable to expand owers and contract protec-
tions in a fluid security environment. Legislative change is to be a constant, medi-
ated through executive action largely freed from policy considerations of civil and 
political rights.  
 
Thirdly, the executive characteristics prompted by the Brigitte incident are con-
firmed and highlighted in other developments which provide insights into the politi-
cal environment of constant legislative revision in which the Attorney-General’s 
reforms are being advanced. The clearest example is found in reform of the Crimi-
nal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provisions dealing with the proscription of organisa-
tions.176 The original bill177 vested a power in the Attorney General or delegate to 
                                                    
171 ‘Inevitably the final legislation was the product of considerable compromise and concession…I make 
no secret of the fact that I do not believe that the legislation as it stands is quite right…And we arin a 
position where possibly we have an outcome that is third or fourth best’: Ruddock, above n 80. 
172 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bb). 
173 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34Y. 
174 Much of the Attorney-General’s criticism of the scope of the detention and questioning powers has 
been levelled against the Senate’s amendments to the riginal bill. However, such criticisms need to be 
assessed in the context of the Government’s strong c ception of restrictive-elite democratic features on 
this issue, and its advocacy of Senate reform which would strip away the Senate’s powers as an effectiv  
house of review: see Resolving Deadlocks: A Discussion Paper on Section 57 of the Australian Constitu-
tion (2003); Harry Evans, ‘When reform adds up to a rubber stamp’, The Age (Melbourne), 25 April 
2002, 13 and  Harry Evans, ‘The Australian Parliament: Time for Reformation’, Address to the National 
Press Club Canberra by Clerk of the Senate 24 April 2002.  
175 See advocacy for the speedy passage of the Criminal Code Amendment (Hamas and Lashkar-E-
Tayyiba) Bill 2003 (Cth):  House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21974 (Hon Philip 
Ruddock) and a similar attitude about the role of Senate Committees scrutinising and reporting upon 
proscribed organisations legislation: House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 November 2003, 21844 (Hon 
Philip Ruddock). For a comparative discussion of the speed of passage of counter-terrorism legislation, 
see Dirk Haubrich, ‘September 11, Anti-Terror laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany 
Compared’ (2003) Government and Opposition 3, 8-10. 
176 In the sense that the proscription of organisations forms the basis for a number of strict liability 
offences, being ‘terrorism offences’ for the purposes of the s.34D ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) warrant proce-
dures. 
177 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 200 (Cth). 
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proscribe organisations on four alternative grounds,178 uch proscription forming the 
basis for applying a range of strict liability offences, carrying a maximum penalty 
of 25 years imprisonment. The legislation passed,179 however, allowed proscription 
only on narrower grounds.180 The significance of proscription is that it attracs a 
range of criminal offences, with substantial penalties, under the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code.181 Dissatisfied with this legislation, the Attorney-General vigor-
ously pursued passage of the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) 
Bill 2003 (Cth), providing for ministerial proscription by regulation of an organisa-
tion as a terrorist organisation.182 The primary reasons argued in support of ministe-
rial proscription were executive in orientation – greater autonomy and flexibility, as 
well as asserting domestic sovereignty in contradistinction to reliance on action by 
the United Nations Security Council.183 The executive dominated approach to the 
proscription of organisations is reinforced by the ex post facto nature of the safe-
                                                    
178 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 200 (Cth) cl 102.2(1)(a)-(d). The most controver-
sial of these grounds permitted proscription on the basis that the organisation has endangered, or is likely
to endanger, the security or integrity of the Commonwealth or of another country: Cl 102.2 (1)(d) of the 
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 200 (Cth). 
179 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth). 
180 These grounds were (i) that an organisation is an incorporated or unincorporated body that directly or 
indirectly engages in, prepares, plans, assists or fosters the doing of a terrorist act or (ii) an organisation 
that has been specified by regulation (as a form of pr scription) upon ministerial satisfaction on reason-
able grounds that the UN Security Council has made a cision relating in whole or part to terrorism and 
that the organisation is identified in the decision, r using a mechanism established under the decision, as 
an organisation to which the decision relates. 
181 The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) was amended in 2002 to create a variety of offences. These 
offences include strict liability offences relating to membership, directing the activities of, funding, 
assisting or providing training to proscribed organis tions: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102.4(1)(a)-
(e). Other offences were based on an intention to perform identified actions with the knowledge that the 
organisation is a terrorist organisation: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102.2(1), 102.4(1), 102.5(1), 
102.6(1) and 102.7 (1)) and, in the alternative, an intention to perform identified actions and recklessness 
as to whether the organisation is a terrorist organisation: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102.2(2), 
102.4(2), 102.5(2), 102.6(2) and 102.7 (2). The identifi d actions include direction, recruitment, provi-
sion or receipt of terrorist organisation training, funding and providing support to terrorist organistions. 
Where membership of a terrorist organisation is alleged, only the higher standard of intention and 
knowledge applies, and a separate defence is available on the balance of probabilities that all reasonble 
steps were taken to cease membership of the organisatio  as soon as practicable after the person knew 
that the organisation was a terrorist organisation. See Carne, above n 11, 15-16.  
182 The criterion being that the Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is 
directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act 
(proposed Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)  s 102.1 (2) offence). 
183 See Ruddock, above n 1 and Ruddock, above n 80. The second of these arguments is consistent with 
the Commonwealth Government’s Review of Interactions with the United Nations Treaty Committee 
System: see Joint Media Release Minister for Foreign Affairs, Attorney-General and Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ‘Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees’, 29 
August 2000  
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2000/fa097_2000.html> (7 February 2001) and ‘Austra 
lian Initiative to Improve the Effectiveness of the UN Treaty Committees’ 5 April 2001  
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/fa043a_01.html> (7 February 2002). See also  
generally Spencer Zifcak, Mr Ruddock Goes to Geneva (2003); Dianne Otto, ‘From ‘reluctance’ to 
‘exceptionalism’: the Australian approach to domestic implementation of human rights’ (2001) 26 
Alternative Law Journal 219 and David Kinley and Penny Martin, ‘International Human Rights at 
Home: Addressing the Politics of Denial’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 466. 
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guards cited.184 These minimal safeguards comprised the capacity to seek an order 
of review in the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court under the ADJR Act 
(Cth)185 relating to a ministerial decision to proscribe an organisation, as well as 
Senate disallowance of the relevant regulations,186 a politically dangerous response. 
 
These incursions on political freedoms, the retraction of proper public critique and 
the contours of public debate by this dangerous model f executive proscription, 
were reflected in the change in Opposition policy to a sanguine acceptance of the 
executive proscription model,187 abandoning its previously advocated judicial 
proscription model.188 Its rejection is both remarkable and ahistorical, as the risks of 
the misuse of an executive proscription model were fo merly canvassed in some 
detail.189  However, the executive model was adopted in the passage of the Criminal 
Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth) on 4 March 2004, with 
the Opposition misleadingly claiming that ‘robust safeguards’190 had been incorpo-
                                                    
184 See ‘A-G Discusses Bill to Ban Terror Organisations and Recall Of The Senate’: Transcript radio 
interview ABC 666 Canberra 5 November 2003  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Web+Pages/BF7B5AADE46B> (5 November  
2003).  
185 See Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6 and 7. S.19 (1) allows the 
making of regulations declaring that a class or classes of decisions to be decisions that are not subject to 
judicial review by the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court under the Act. It is therefore 
feasible that decisions relating to the proscription of organisations under Criminal Code (Cth) Division 
102 could be wholly, partly, or incrementally excluded from review under the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), leaving only such judicial review before the High Court as constitu-
tionally mandated by s 75 (v) of the Australian Constitution and explained in Plaintiff S157/2002 v 
Commonwealth (2003) 195 ALR 24. The exclusion under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977 Schedule 1 of decisions made under the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) and also under the Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 (Cth) as decisions to which the Act does not apply, further reduces the scope of 
judicial review of proscription decisions, as the advice by ASIO to the Attorney General will necessarily 
be a prelude to the administrative act of ministerial proscription under Division 102 of the Criminal 
Code (Cth). Similarly, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s.7 and Schedule 2 Part 1 operate to 
exclude intelligence agency documents preparatory t the act of Ministerial proscription from being 
subject to freedom of information provisions. 
186 See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 1 (c) and ss 2 to 5A. A Government majority in the Senate 
from 1 July 2005, following the 9 October 2004 Federal election, effectively removes this “safeguard” 
and confirms the originally highlighted dangers of executive proscription. 
187 See Steve Lewis, ‘Security alert for Labor’, The Australian, 20-21 December 2003, 24. The ruthlessly 
political nature of this about face is evidenced by the Opposition’s resistance to conferring an Executive 
power of proscription only a month earlier: see Senat , Hansard, 7 November 2003, 16822 on debate 
about the Criminal Code Amendment (Hamas and Lashkar-E-Tayyib) Bill 2003 (Cth) (Senator Hon 
John Faulkner). 
188 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21955 (Robert McClelland). 
189 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21955-21956 (Robert McClelland). See 
also comments on the risks of executive proscription in House of Representatives Hansard 5 November 
2003, 21960 (Hon Duncan Kerr) and in Senate, Hansard, 7 November 2003, 16822-16823 (Senator Hon 
John Faulkner). See also Head, above n 123, 124 and Hocking, above n 17, 211. 
190 See Senate, Hansard, 3 March 2004, 20519. The extremely limited ‘safeguards’ comprise a briefing 
of the Leader of the Opposition of the proposed regulation; a process whereby the Minister must con-
sider a de-listing application made on the ground that here is no basis for the Minister to be satisfied that 
the listed organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering 
the doing of a terrorist act; a discretion (not obligation) for the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD to review the regulation proscribing a terrorist organisation and to report the Commit-
tee’s comments and recommendations to each House of Parliament before the end of the applicable 
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rated within the amended legislation. The highly partis n character that the debate 
about further expansion of counter-terrorism powers ha  taken was reflected by the 
starkly contrasting appraisals of the content of the safeguards and the reasons for 
the passage of the legislation, by the Attorney-General191 and the Opposition 
Spokesperson for Homeland Security.192  
 
The merits based judicial proscription model, under which an application would be 
made to a court for listing of a terrorist organisation, had previously been rejected 
by the Attorney-General on strongly asserted executive grounds.193 The judicial 
proscription model was considered, by erroneous and inverted reasoning, to infringe 
the doctrine of the separation of powers: 
 
I cannot imagine anything that might infringe the separation of powers     
doctrine more than what is being proposed here by the opposition – that I, 
that you hand over to a judicial body the decision as to whether or not a 
body ought to be proscribed.194  
 
The factors central to a court’s role in a judicial proscription model, namely the 
assessment of rights and duties, the characterisation nd weighing of evidence, the 
interpretation of legislation and the reaching of a determination contingent to the 
operation of consequences, are characteristics of a kind consistently identified by 
the High Court as being intrinsic to the exercise of Chapter III judicial power.195 
Such an error displays both the centrality of executive control of the reforms and a 
noticeable misunderstanding of the separation of powers under the Australian 
Constitution. 
 
                                                                                                                       
disallowance period for that House; and a review of the listing provisions by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee as soon as possible three years after their commencement: see Schedule 1- Amendments of 
the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth), inserting new ss 102.1 (2), 
(2A), (4), (5), (6), (17), (18), and 102.1A (1)-(4) into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).  
191 The Attorney General contested the claim that the Opposition had succeeded in obtaining additional 
safeguards: House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 March 2004, 25372.   
192 See the comments House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 March 2004, 25372-25373 (Robert 
McClelland). See also Senate, Hansard, 3 March 2004, 20522-20523 (Senator Hon John Faulkner). 
Importantly, the ex post facto judicial review process is dependent upon the operation of the ADJR Act 
1977 (Cth) attaching to the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth), as 
discussed above. Furthermore, the process of consultation with state and territory leaders prior to the 
listing of an organisation has not been incorporated into the amending legislation. 
193 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 November 2003, 21844-21845 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
194 See House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 November 2003, 21973 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
195 See for example, Huddart Parker and Co v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); R v 
Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries (1970) 123 CLR 361, 374 (Kitto J); Re Tracy; 
Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580 (Deane J); Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 147 (Gaud-
ron J); Brandy v HREOC (1995) 183 CLR 245, 268 (Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).  
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IV SELECTION AND DISTORTION OF CONCEPTS ARISING     
FROM THE BRIGITTE INCIDENT 
 
Furthermore, this executive claim arising from the Brigitte incident for an expan-
sion of detention and questioning power is based on several false premises, concep-
tual confusions and selectivity in the presentation of supportive material. Discrete 
characteristics are identifiable – the strong detention and questioning powers being 
taken out of an appropriate comparative context; inappropriate jurisdictional com-
parisons; considerations of French counter-terrorism powers without mention of the 
systemic human rights abuses separately established n different forums; confusion 
over criminal law versus intelligence gathering models; reliance on a highly prob-
lematic balancing of rights with powers, as well as contradictions in preferred 
accountability models governing the exercise of executive power. These character-
istics will be examined in turn. 
 
A Decontextualising the potency of existing detention and 
questioning powers 
The characterisation of the ASIO incommunicado detention and questioning powers 
as substantially limited in comparison with powers available in France,196 involves a 
misleading comparison abstracted from the unprecedent  nature of powers identi-
fied during the debate preceding passage of the bill.197 The changes made from the 
bill to the legislation are of particular significance. Under the earlier versions of the 
bill, ASIO was able to obtain warrants for detentio and questioning for a relatively 
short period of 48 hours,198 and a federal magistrate or judge had to approve origi-
nal or subsequent warrants, following a detailed application process by the Director 
General of ASIO to the Attorney General. A fresh application process satisfying the 
threshold criteria had to be repeated for further wa rants.199 However, following a 
government ‘compromise’, the legislation provides for a single, seven day warrant 
in which 24 hours of questioning may take place, with the continuation of question-
ing beyond successive eight hour intervals determined by the prescribed authority, 
in place of a fresh warrant being obtained under judicial authority for further ques-
tioning. 
 
                                                    
196 See Ruddock, ‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions’, above n 12 and Ruddock, above n 
1.       
197 Detention duration and its application to non-suspects were identified as exceeding relevant, recently 
enacted legislation in comparable jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the United 
States. The ambit of the government’s present claim for further detention powers is highlighted by its 
December 2002 rejection of the Opposition’s questioning model, which itself exceeded powers granted 
over citizens in these comparable jurisdictions: See House of Representatives, Hansard, 12 December 
2002, 10430 and 10565 (Hon Simon Crean) and 10435 and 10569 (Hon Kim Beazley). 
198 See Clauses 34D(2)(b)(i) and 34F(4)(a) of the original version of the bill. 
199 This obligation is implicit Clause 34C(5) (and its note), which required the granting of a warrant only 
by a Deputy President of the AAT if the continuous period of detention was to exceed 96 hours. 
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This provides a significant extension of power in expanding detention time, the 
flexibility of questioning within that detention time and the removal of the external 
normative producing requirement to seek a fresh detention and questioning warrant 
every 48 hours200 from a judge or federal magistrate, with the independence of 
tenure under the Australian Constitution and removed from the actual questioning. 
Devolving authority to the prescribed authority present at the questioning to author-
ise continuation of questioning and detention enhances a capacity for preventative 
detention, as a quite modest threshold applies where a subsequent warrant is 
sought.201 In many situations it would be expected that some additional information 
would be obtained from the preceding 24 hours of questioning over seven days, to 
comply with the threshold for a further seven day warrant. Furthermore, the second 
requirement of not currently being in detention imposes no minimum time interval 
before which a person may be taken back into custody under a second or subse-
quent warrant.202 
 
B Inappropriate inter-jurisdictional comparisons 
The Attorney General’s mooted reforms also disregard the fact that common law 
based legal systems regularly and readily comparable with Australia – such as the 
United Kingdom,203 Canada,204 New Zealand205 and the United States206- none 
permits incommunicado detention of its citizens notsuspected of any criminal 
offence for the purposes of counter-terrorism intellig nce gathering. The existence 
of bills of rights in these jurisdictions207 has set boundaries to the legislative debate 
and response about intelligence gathering from indiv duals for counter-terrorism 
purposes and has made rights evaluation more prominent  that equation.208 Such 
                                                    
200 Instead, a person exercising authority under the warrant ‘may request the prescribed authority to 
permit the questioning to continue’ beyond the respective 8 hours or 16 hours: see ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 
34HB (3). 
201 The issuing authority must be additionally satisfied that (i) the issue of that warrant is justified by 
information additional to or materially different from that known to the Director-General at the time th  
Director-General sought the Minister’s consent to request the issue of the last of the earlier warrants 
issued before the seeking of the Minister’s consent to the request for the issue of the warrant requested; 
and (ii) the person is not being detained…in connection with one of the earlier warrants: ASIO Act 1979 
(Cth) s 34D (1A)(b)(i) and (ii). 
202 See ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34D (1A)(ii). 
203 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK). 
204 Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (Canada) Act No 41 of 2001. 
205 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (NZ). 
206 USA Patriot Act 2001 Public Law No 107-56. 
207 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (Constitution Act, 
1982 Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK)); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1991 (NZ); United States 
Bill of Rights Amendments I to XXVII of the United States Constitution (Articles in addition to, and 
amendment of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the legislatures of the 
several states pursuant to the fifth article of the original constitution). 
208 The report by the UK Committee of Privy Counsellors n the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 (UK) is the most recent illustration of this effect: see Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report , Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 
122(5) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (2003), Part 4-Immigration and Asylum, 48-
68. See also George Williams ‘National Security, Terrorism and Bills of Rights’ (2003) 9 Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 263, 270 and Williams, above n 19. 
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bills of rights have exerted some restraint over the tendency of the Executive to 
elevate its interests at the expense of the interests of proportionality and necessity in 
counter-terrorism legislative responses. 
 
In contrast, the citation of French detention laws nd their extensive scope, deriving 
from a civil law system, as a paradigm to which Australia should refer for a further 
enlargement of powers already exceeding comparable common law democracies, is 
as strikingly radical a proposition as incommunicado detention of non-suspects 
itself. More remarkable is the highly artificial manner in which the French system 
has been presented, omitting any consideration of systemically established French 
human rights abuses in terrorism intelligence gathering 
 
C French terrorism laws: sans human rights abuses 
A proposed expansion of ASIO detention and questioning powers, modelled upon 
the features of the French legal system, which permits three to four years of pre-trial 
detention for the gathering of evidence by a body of five anti-terrorist magistrates 
against a terrorist suspect, ignores systemic human rights abuses identified within 
that system. The inspiration of the French system in the advocacy of extended 
intelligence gathering detention superficially identifies an elected system of gov-
ernment possessing such powers, therefore making a simplistic equation of ‘democ-
racy’ as synonymous with human rights observance.209  
 
The issues raised by the Attorney-General about thresholds for detention and ques-
tioning warrants and the length of detention time are significant because features of 
the French system provide open opportunities for human rights abuses. That system 
permits four days of intense questioning in police custody, three days of which is 
without access to a lawyer, prior to years of investigative detention once a formal 
investigation by special anti-terrorism magistrates is commenced. During such 
investigative detention, an exhaustive conspiracy based charge of ‘criminal associa-
tion relating to a terrorist enterprise’210 is frequently used to justify holding suspects 
for extended periods211 of preventative detention. This is the charge thathas been 
filed against Willy Brigitte.212  
 
                                                    
209 “But what you do have is an example here of broader powers that an intelligence agency in a devel-
oped Western country – namely, France – has in relation to being able to detain and question people”: 
Ruddock, ‘Intelligence delay has Ruddock asking questions’, above n 12. 
210 One commentator considers this approach as a de-legitimising process, stripping away human rights 
from terrorism suspects and non-suspects alike, with anti-terrorism measures then leaking into main-
stream criminal investigative processes: see Colin Warbrick, ‘The Principles of the European Conventio 
on Human Rights and the Response of States to Terrorism’ [2002] 3 European Human Rights Law  
Review 287, 288, 297. 
211 The purpose is often as much for intelligence gathering purposes as for investigation of a particular 
criminal offence: see Warbrick, above n 210, 299. 
212 Brigitte’s lawyer, Harry Durimel, stated ‘Association in the aim of committing a terror act…It mean 
that they are investigating to find, are suspicion of him being in the plot to commit a terror act. OK, 
because he’s in touch or has been in touch with people that are suspecting of being organiser of terror 
act’: Interview with Harry Durimel, above n 3. 
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The methods for invoking such powers have raised serious concerns about abuse of 
process. The leading French anti-terrorist magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, prac-
tises the indiscriminate arrest of large numbers of persons, followed by interroga-
tion, in the hope of uncovering genuine terrorist offenders.213 In one instance this 
led to a large number of defendants subjected to prolonged detention, only subse-
quently to have charges dropped, be acquitted or receiv  suspended sentences.214 In 
its 2001 annual report, Amnesty International observed: 
 
The methods of France’s specialised “anti-terrorism” investigative judges 
and the 14th section of the Paris prosecution service continued to be 
brought into question by a number of court decision, particularly with re-
gard to the abusive use of provisional detention and to a catch-all conspir-
acy charge “criminal association with a terrorist enterprise”215 
 
These criticisms refer to the detention powers that t e Attorney General has looked 
favourably upon as a model for expanding Australian intelligence gathering deten-
tion powers.  
 
D French terrorism laws: findings of breaches of the 
European Convention on Human Rights  
France’s anti-terrorism laws have also been found to breach articles of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. In Tomasi v France,216 Tomasi, a French na-
tional who was a member of Corsican independence organisation, was detained 
under anti-terrorism laws, for a period of five years nd seven months.217 The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights found violations of Articles 5(3),218 3219 and 6(1)220 of 
                                                    
213 Known as the “Bruguiere method”: see Henri Astier, ‘P ofile: France’s top anti-terror judge’, BBC 
News Online, 1 July 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi europe/3031640.stm> (19 November 2003) and  
Jocelyn Noveck, ‘France’s anti-terrorism judge tracks suspects across the globe’, Arizona Daily Star, 4 
December 2001 <http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/indepth/id-frenchjudge.html> (19 November 2003). 
214 See Amnesty International Report 2001: France  
<http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webeurcontries/FRANCE?OpenDocu> (19 November 
2003) under the heading ‘Islamist network’ trials. 
215 Amnesty International Report 2001: France, above n 214. The report particularly criticised the use of 
the conspiracy charge of criminal association with a terrorist enterprise, one example of the broad 
application of this charge resulting in 55 acquittals out of 138 persons charged, and in another 16 out of 
24 suspected members of a suspected Islamist network ere acquitted of the conspiracy charge. The 
2004 Amnesty International Report for France notes that detainees continue to face lengthy provisional 
detention and that a law on organised crime aimed to ex end the 96 hour special custody regime to a 
wider range of offences: < http://web.amnesty.org/repo t2004/fra-summary-eng> (28 May 2004).  
216 Case Number 27/1991/279/350 European Court of Human Rights. 
217 The time includes detention during the course of judicial proceedings leading to his acquittal. 
218 Article 5(3) states that ‘Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1.c of this article shall be brought promptly befor a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercis  
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial’. 
219 Article 3 states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. 
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the Convention. In relation to Article 5(3), it was found that the French courts failed 
to act with the necessary promptness, the length of the contested detention not 
essentially attributable either to the complexity of the case or to Tomasi’s con-
duct.221 In relation to Article 3, Tomasi’s complaint of injuries inflicted in detention 
consistent with the records of complaint made to an investigating judge and the 
reports of four examining doctors at the end of his police custody,222 comprising 
sustained ill treatment.223 These records were in the opinion of the Court sufficient 
to find that the treatment was both inhuman and degrading,224 with ‘the undeniable 
difficulties inherent in the fight against crime, particularly in regard to terrorism, 
cannot result in limits being placed on the protection o be afforded in respect of the 
physical integrity of individuals’.225 In relation to the alleged violation of Article 
6(1), namely Tomasi’s complaint of the time taken to examine his claim of the ill 
treatment suffered during police custody, responsibility for the delays was found by 
the Court to lie essentially with the judicial authorities, thus establishing a violation 
of Article 6(1).  
 
These types of abuses within the French system of the investigation of terrorism 
suspects are facilitated by the provision of broader nti-terrorism powers and discre-
tions superimposed on a criminal investigative system for non-terrorism offences, 
which itself has been the subject of serious breachs of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. In Selmouni v France,226 Selmouni, a Netherlands and Moroccan 
national, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in drug trafficking and subjected 
to prolonged and severe ill treatment in police custody. The European Court of 
Human Rights found that the acts complained of constituted torture under Article 3 
of the Convention.227 In particular, the Court found that physical and mental pain 
and suffering was intentionally inflicted for the pur ose of obtaining a confes-
sion;228 that the acts229 were sufficient to arouse feelings of fear, anguish and inferi-
ority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical 
and moral resistance;230 and that the intensity and frequency of the physical and 
                                                                                                                       
220 Article 6(1) states that ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced quickly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the int rests of justice.’ 
221 See Tomasi v France paragraph 102. 
222 Ibid 108, 110. 
223 This ill treatment persisted for a period beyond forty hours by those responsible for his interrogation: 
Tomasi v France paragraph 108. 
224 Ibid 115. 
225 Ibid 115. 
226 European Court of Human Rights Application No 25806/94 28 July 1999. 
227 Selmouni v France paragraph 106. 
228 Ibid I98. 
229 The Court was satisfied that these acts included a large number of blows in repeated and sustained 
assaults over a number of days of questioning, but also included a range of other serious abuses: S l-
mouni v France paragraphs 102 and 103. 
230 Selmouni v France paragraph 99. 
 608   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
mental violence, caused severe pain and was particul ly serious and cruel.231 Such 
a culture of human rights abuse is even more likely to be propagated in terrorism 
investigation matters, where access to lawyers is further curtailed232 and detention is 
protracted233 with relatively weak review mechanisms.234  
 
E French terrorism laws: United Nations findings of 
breaches of human rights 
United Nations human rights treaty body committees have also commented ad-
versely on the operation of France’s anti-terrorism laws and policies. Specifically, 
the Human Rights Committee, in its concluding observations on the third periodic 
report of France under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
made several pointed criticisms: 
 
The Committee is concerned about the continued application of the anti-
terrorist laws of 2 September 1986 and 16 December 1992 which provide 
for a centralized court with prosecutors having special powers of arrest, 
search and prolonged detention in police custody for up to four days (twice 
the normal length), and according to which an accused does not have the 
same rights in the determination of guilt as in the ordinary courts. The 
Committee is furthermore concerned that the accused has no right to con-
tact a lawyer during the initial 72 hours of detentio  in police custody. The 
Committee is concerned that there is no appeal provided for against the 
decisions of this special court. The Committee regrets that the State party 
did not provide information about which authority in practice takes the de-
cision whether a case is handled under the ordinary criminal law or under 
anti-terrorist laws, and about the role played by police in this decision. The 
Committee has now been given information as regards statistics on trials 
concluded under the anti-terrorism laws, but it is nformed that many hun-
dreds of people are being detained, investigated and tried for committing 
acts of terrorism or related offences. Therefore in the circumstances, the 
Committee would recommend that anti-terrorism laws, hich appear to be 
                                                    
231 Ibid paragraphs 104 and 105. 
232 France’s representations at consideration of its second periodic report under the Convention Against 
Torture revealed that changes allowing access to a lawyer during the first hour of custody ‘were not 
envisioned to apply to acts of terrorism’: Summary Record of 320th meeting: Committee Against Torture 
UN Document CAT/C/SR.320 14 September 1998, paragraph 7. There is no right to contact a lawyer 
during the initial 72 hours of detention in police ustody: see Concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document CCPR/C/79/ Add.80, paragraph 23. 
233 Initial detention in police custody is for up to fur days, twice the normal length of detention: Con-
cluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80, paragraph 23. 
234 ‘The Act of Parliament of 30 December 1996 on terrorism related pre-trial detention…strengthened 
safeguards for persons under investigation, in particular by limiting the use of pre-trial detention, which 
could not exceed a ‘reasonable’ period based on the gravity of the alleged acts: the judge must end 
detention once it exceeded a reasonable period’: submission of France, Summary Record of 320th 
meeting: Committee Against Torture UN Document CAT/C/SR.320 14 September 1998, paragraph 9. 
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necessary to combat terrorism, be brought fully into conformity with the 
requirements of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.235 
 
Three other human rights issues, significant in the light of France’s counter-
terrorism legislation and policies, were highlighted by the Committees. The first 
was repeated allegations of violence and ill treatmnt of detainees by law enforce-
ment officials,236 likely to be exacerbated by the reduced rights accorded to persons 
detained for terrorism offences, with foreigners and immigrants particularly vulner-
able.237 The second area of concern was the frequency and length of pre-trial deten-
tion.238 The third item, namely France’s repatriation of terrorism suspects to 
demonstrated situations of potential torture,239 reinforces preceding evidence of an 
inadequate human rights attitudinal and procedural framework in investigating 
terrorism offences. A most exceptional aspect was the extra-judicial repatriation of 
suspects from the French to the Spanish police, a ‘practice whereby the police hand 
over individuals to their counterparts in another country, despite the fact that a 
                                                    
235 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80, paragraph 23. Article 9 of the ICCPR includes a range of due process rights such as 
liberty and security of the person, freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, the establishment of lawful 
grounds for arrest and arrest procedures, the rightto be brought promptly before a judge, the right to take 
proceedings before a court to decide the lawfulness of detention and an enforceable right to compensa-
tion for anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention. Article 14 of the ICCPR in-
cludes a range of due process rights relating to pre-trial and trial matters. 
236 See Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80, paragraph 16; Committee Against Tor ure Summary record of the public part of the 
323rd meeting: France 11 May 1998 UN Document CAT/C/SR.323 D. Subjects of Concern, paragraph 5; 
Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: France 27 May 1998 UN Document 
A/53/44, paragraph 143 (e). 
237 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80, paragraph 16. 
238 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: France 4 August 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80, paragraph 17. The French delegation claimed improvements in relation to these 
issues, with 34 per cent of persons under investigation subject to pre-trial detention in 1994, compared to 
44 per cent in 1985, whilst also stating that “A new law, which had entered into force on 31 March 1997, 
was aimed at reducing the length of pre-trial detention…That law…was not the first effort made to 
reduce the period of pre-trial detention, the Act of 6 August 1995 having already imposed a limit”: 
Human Rights Committee Summary record of the 1597th meeting: France 24 July 1997 UN Document 
CCPR/C/SR.1597, paragraph 53. See also Committee Against Torture Summary record of the 320th 
meeting: France UN Document CAT/C/SR.320, paragraph 9. In contrast, more stringent review require-
ments were imposed on other criminal offences. 
239 See Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: France 27 May 1998 UN Document 
A/53/44, paragraph 143 (d); Human Rights Committee Summary record of the 1598th meeting: France 20 
October 1997 UN Document CCPR/C/SR.1598 paragraph 29. Such deportation involves a potential 
violation of States Parties obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which states ‘1. 
No State party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 2. For the purpose 
of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all 
relevant considerations including, where applicable, th  existence in the State concerned of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’. 
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French court has declared such practices to be illegal’.240 In the communication of 
Arana v France,241 the Committee Against Torture recalled that: 
 
[D]uring the consideration of the third periodic report submitted by 
Spain…it had expressed its concern regarding the complaints of acts of 
torture and ill treatment which it frequently received. It also noted that, 
notwithstanding the legal guarantees as to the conditi s under which it 
could be imposed, there were cases of prolonged detention incommuni-
cado, when the detainee could not receive the assist nce of a lawyer of his 
choice, which seemed to facilitate the practice of torture. Most of the com-
plaints received concerned torture inflicted during such periods.242 
 
The Committee found that the deportation to Spain occurred in circumstances 
constituting a violation of Article 3 of the Convention: 
 
The deportation was effected under an administrative procedure, which the 
Administrative Court of Pau had later found to be illegal, entailing a direct 
handover from police to police, without the intervention of a judicial author-
ity and without any possibility for the author to cntact his family or his 
lawyer. That meant that a detainee’s rights had not been respected and had 
placed the author in a situation where he was particularly vulnerable to pos-
sible abuse.243 
 
It is improper to raise the desirability of liberalising Australia’s counter-terrorism 
detention and questioning laws by highlighting the supposed superiority of the 
French system, whilst abstracting from that discussion a record of serious human 
rights violations. Adoption of the central features of the French system would 
transform Australian laws to a dragnet method of terrorism intelligence gathering 
and an acceptance that innocent detained persons must inevitably experience seri-
ous human rights violations. The certainty and regularity of such violations should 
be honestly and directly confronted in the “balance” paradigm when advocacy of 
the French model is used in favour of liberalising the availability and duration of 
Australian counter-terrorism detention and questioning warrants and the relaxation 




                                                    
240 See Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: France 27 May 1998 UN Document 
A/53/44 paragraph 143 (d) and Summary record of the public part of the 323rd meeting: France 11 May 
1998 UN Document CAT/C/SR.323 paragraph D 4. 
241 Committee Against Torture Communication No 63/1997. 
242 Committee Against Torture Communication No 63/ 1997 UN Document CAT/C/23/D/63/1997 
paragraph 11.4. 
243 Committee Against Torture Arana v France Communication No 63/1997: France 5 June 2000 UN 
Document CAT/C/23/D/63/1997 paragraph 11.5. 
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F Creating or Creative Confusion? Criminal Law versus In-
telligence Gathering Models 
The difficulties identified in the French system are further compounded by confu-
sions over criminal law versus intelligence gathering models for counter-terrorism 
detention and questioning powers. In its evidence before Parliamentary Committee 
enquiries into the ASIO Legislation (Terrorism) Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth), the 
Attorney-General’s department justified its support f  the far reaching impact upon 
the rights of innocent persons who may have information relating to terrorist activ-
ity, on the basis that the bill was an intelligence gathering model, as distinct from a 
criminal investigative model. The new threat of inter ational terror demanded a 
fresh paradigm, abandoning reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement as a 
central operating principle, and substituting instead an intrusive ability to gather 
intelligence from non suspects and suspects alike. Rh torical justifications claimed 
that differentiated intelligence gathering models, such as those in the United King-
dom and Canada, had been considered but were unsuitable for Australian circum-
stances.244    
 
The unarticulated foundation of the Attorney-General’s claim for an expanded 
detention and questioning regime modelled on the French system is, ironically, a 
criminal law investigative model. Of course, the French system of extended deten-
tion of terrorist suspects is premised on the civil law concept of the investigating 
magistrate for criminal matters, and in its relevant manifestation upon a broad, 
catch all terrorism conspiracy-involvement holding charge.245 It would not be sur-
prising if reform proposals from the department inter al review of the legislation 
follow a similar approach, discounting previous departmental strictures against a 
criminal law model for an intelligence gathering function.246  
 
This differentiation of criminal law and intelligence gathering purposes for deten-
tion and questioning warrants is also selective and highly opinionated, as the two 
categories seem confusingly distinguished to rationl se expansions in executive 
questioning and detention power. On the one hand, the supposed differences pro-
vide the reasons for rejecting more restricted intell gence gathering models from 
comparable jurisdictions: 
 
The major cornerstones of consideration were the obvious culprits – the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada and New Zealand. The legislation from those 
jurisdictions was in fact considered in the drafting of this legislation, but there were 
two very distinct differences in some of that legislation. One was that most of that 
legislation is law enforcement based…we took the view that this was about intelli-
                                                    
244 See Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee Hansard 12 November 2002, 3-4. 
245 See Astier, above n 213. 
246 Although the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth) did not include amendments to the s 34D warrant 
provisions of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), its inclusion of a broadly based offence of associating with 
terrorist organisations as s.102.8 in Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) as a ‘terrorism offence’, within 
that meaning in s.4 of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), will significantly expand the situations in which the 
warrant request and issue procedures might be invoked. 
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gence collection and not law enforcement, before the event rather than after the 
event, we then went outside the parameters or looked utside the square to see how 
ASIO as an agency might deal with those matters…In terms of the discrepancies, I 
think it is fair to say…that in the United Kingdom, for example, yes, it is a law 
enforcement technique that they have there…I think there is a similar provision in 
Canada…Again I go back to the comment I made earlier, that those laws were 
drafted in the context of law enforcement agencies investigating an offence.247 
 
This apparent confusion of principle appeared in other evidence before the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee: 
 
Having looked at Dr Carne’s submission and his supplementary submis-
sion to the committee, as best as I can understand what he is driving at I 
still think there is a fundamental distinction betwen Dr Carne’s proposal 
and what has been proposed in the bill – and that, ag in, is the distinction 
between doing things broadly for a law enforcement purpose for the inves-
tigation of criminal offences or the gathering of criminal intelligence and 
what has been proposed under the bill for the gathering of intelligence for 
security purpose in relation to terrorism.248 
 
In sharp contradistinction, the legal arrangements i  the UK and Canada are in-
voked later on to argue that the detention procedures for non-suspects under the 
Australian bill cannot be compared to legislation used in Malaysia, Singapore and 
South Africa. In contrast, the Australian proposals are seen as properly comparable 
on this occasion with the UK and Canada: 
 
Others would disagree, but I think you would be drawing a long bow to see 
the powers in Malaysia and Singapore and these powers as similar. You 
could look at the UK and Canada, where there are similar common law 
principles to those that instruct our legal framework. Ultimately, it is our 
rule of law, it is the totality of the legal system that would separate us from 
other countries that might have powers of detention. F r proper parallels, I 
believe you would need to go to countries, as I have said, such as the UK 
                                                    
247 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 12 November 2002, 3-4. 
248 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 18 November 2002, 107. The 
evidence presented before the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee clearly expounded 
an alternative intelligence gathering model based on the Canadian investigative hearing model under Part 
II.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code, adapted for Australian constitutional circumstances, similar to the 
Canadian investigative hearing, and did not proceed from a criminal law model. See Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee, ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), 
Submissions 24 and 24A and witness submission Senate Legal and Constitutional References Commit-
tee, Hansard, 14 November 2002, 90-104. Ironically, further observations were made about the ‘clear 
distinction between the criminal process and the security intelligence process’: Senate Legal and Consti-
tutional References Committee, Hansard, 18 November 2002, 111. This confusion prompted former 
legal academic and Committee member, Senator Linda Kirk, to observe ‘I am still trying to get my head 
around the distinction between intelligence gathering and criminal investigation’: Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 18 November 2002, 119. 
2004 Brigitte and the French Connection  613     
 
and Canada, which do share with us a common law system and the princi-
ples involved.249 
 
These later observations contradict the earlier ration les advanced by the Attorney-
General’s department. This inconsistent invocation and blurring of principle 
prompted the representative of the Australian Law Council to remark to the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee: 
 
The question of principle is most clearly focused in this quite disturbing 
elision and confusion of concept advanced by ASIO, maybe by the AFP 
and certainly by the government in relation to what might be called ‘pro-
phylactic detention’, which is nonsense. It is the notion that detention for 
the purpose of questioning also has the legitimate purpose of keeping 
somebody incommunicado from the people who might be their cohorts in a 
wicked endeavour so as to either prevent the crime from being committed 
or to prevent that person from assisting in that crime. This is to confuse the 
notion of non-suspects being questioned with the notio  that somebody 
suspected of being a conspirator – that is, having already committed a seri-
ous offence – should be charged. Such a person, in the ordinary course, 
would no doubt be denied bail. That is a totally different, orthodox 
method. No one calls that prophylactic detention. Bail is not for the pur-
pose of preventing somebody from committing an offence, but it is to 
make sure that they are available to answer the requirements of criminal 
justice.250 
 
The fact that there is no rigid barrier to dual usage of information obtained251 em-
phasises the convenience in the distinctions claimed. 
 
G  Imbalances in the balancing model 
Such usages are more than an elision of principles. Instead, they suggest that the 
“balancing” model of powers and rights, which the Attorney General claims in 
relation to the Brigitte incident, has produced toomany checks and balances,252 is 
fundamentally flawed. The preceding material suggests that the balancing para-
                                                    
249 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 18 November 2002, 120. 
250 Brett Walker SC, Member, Law Council of Australia and President of the NSW Bar Association 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Hansard, 26 November 2002, 247. 
251 Whilst use immunity is applied to information obtained or things or records produced, there is no 
derivative use immunity under the legislation: see ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34G (9)(a) and (b). A relevant 
example was the attempt to charge two alleged Brigitte associates, with the use of relevant ASIO intelli-
gence restricted to an evidentiary resource from which the police could build a case on the charges using 
other methods: see Martin Chulov, ‘Brigitte suspects: police thwarted’, The Australian, 9 February 2004, 
1. 
252 ‘Our laws, because of the efforts to put in place ch cks and balances, may have been too checked…’ 
Hon P Ruddock comments to ABC Radio reported in ‘Australian to Review Anti-Terror Laws with Eye 
on Stronger Powers’, 3 November 2003 <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/031103/1/3fjdb.html> (21 November 
2003). 
 614   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
digm, applied to proposals to broaden the availabilty and duration of warrants, is 
susceptible to arguments diminishing civil and political rights without coherently 
integrating an intelligence gathering mechanism within a framework securing the 
institutions, values and practices of democracy. Accordingly, the balancing model 
encounters problems in addressing national security issues in general and “balance” 
references relating to warrant powers need to be mor  sceptically considered within 
that broader question.  
 
Information called to support “balance” issues justifying an expansion of warrant 
powers is presupposed as factually accurate, legally accessible and open to system-
atic critique in the media and in parliamentary processes. Instead, the very secrecy 
of intelligence gathering measures against terrorism is at odds with these character-
istics and reflects the practical impossibility of testing the veracity of the national 
security policy claim. The model of competition and conflict between the values 
produces an ascendancy of national security values ov r civil rights values, and 
does so under the guise of a supposedly neutral process. In effect, civil rights values 
are relegated to a residual or negative form of liberty as against national security 
prerogatives, with considerable discretion and deference afforded to executive 
interests. The national security aspect in the balance is inevitably given special 
weighting, producing a structural inequality in that “balance”. 
 
These considerations suggest a general unsuitability of the balancing paradigm for 
reconciling national security and democratic interests, even more so in the situation 
of warrant intelligence gathering and detention powers applied to innocent persons. 
This unsuitability is evident in that traditionally, the balancing theory only de-
manded modest rights concessions in response to modest threats, whereas the inde-
terminate nature of the war on terror raises the prospect of a decades long corrosion 
of rights and freedoms.253 Adherence to human rights definitive of liberal democ-
ratic societies threatened by terrorism is also important because such adherence may 
produce more efficient law enforcement outcomes.254 
 
H Contradictions in the preferred accountability models 
The Attorney General’s suggestion from the Brigitte ncident that the ASIO deten-
tion and questioning warrant requirements have been too rigorously set disconnects 
that threshold from the Government’s preferred human rights accountability model 
expressed elsewhere. The government’s rejection of a judicially supervised bill of 
rights as a foundation for the protection of human rights has been justified on the 
grounds of a strong tradition of representative Parliamentary democracy, the rule of 
law and Australia’s unique common law, statutory and constitutional arrange-
ments.255 Inevitably, the secrecy and anonymity of the measures involved in the 
                                                    
253 Kerr, above n 58, 2. 
254 See Bronnitt, above n 31, 80. 
255 See, for example, A-G’s Press Release ‘UN Human Rights Committee’ 29 July 2000  
<http://www.law.gov.au/aghome/agnes/2000newsag/796_htm > (7 July 2001) [in asserting the Austra 
 
2004 Brigitte and the French Connection  615     
 
detention and questioning warrants, means that these preferred accountability 
mechanisms are severely compromised and rendered largely inapplicable. 
 
The reliance upon ministerial responsibility as an accountability mechanism in the 
operation of detention and questioning warrants throws these issues into sharp 
focus. The Brigitte incident illustrates how the exclusionary concept of operational 
matters256 acts to inhibit and generalise public scrutiny about intelligence gathering 
in a manner that dramatically curtails public and parliamentary accountability. 
Simultaneously, such generalisations can heighten sp culation and fear about terror-
ist threats, changing the political climate for debate and producing a laxity in the 
scrutiny of proposed reforms. 
 
The concept of operational matters as a broad exclusionary mechanism has been 
formalised through inclusion in the rushed passage of the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Act 2003 (Cth),257 strengthening prohibitions against communicating 
information arising from the issuing of and information obtained from or related to 
detention and questioning warrants. Operational information is also included as a 
component of a much more broadly based offence of disclosure of information 
whilst a warrant is in force,258 making media reporting of such operational informa-
tion, the fact that a warrant has been issued, a fact relating to the content of a war-
rant or to the questioning or detention of a person in connection with a warrant, a 
criminal offence punishable by up to five years imprisonment.259   
 
Other accountability mechanisms, particularly the role of the issuing authority 
under the existing criteria, rather than justifying liberalisation, assume a heightened 
                                                                                                                       
lian government’s discretion about how it implements its international obligations under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]: ‘In Australia we do so through a combination of strong 
democratic institutions, the common law and an extensive array of statutes and programs at the Com-
monwealth, State and Territory level. This fits our ci cumstances and is highly effective’; see also 
Attorney-General’s Transcript of Speech, ‘Writing the Rights – Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’.  
28 March 2003:  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/ag/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2003_Spee> (2 No 
vember 2004) and the similar statements of Leslie Luck, Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva: United Nations Press Release Human Rights Committee 69th session 20 July 2000 and  
Report of Australia and United Nations Press Releas Committee Against Torture 25th session 16 
November 2000 Report of Australia. 
256  For example, the Attorney General declined to provide greater specificity about investigations in the
Brigitte matter: Ruddock, ‘Interview: Philip Ruddock’, above n 12 and Ruddock, above n 1. The Direc-
tor-General of ASIO also declined to comment as to whether the detention and questioning powers had 
been used in relation to the Brigitte case on the grounds of it being an ongoing operational matter: se
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 143 and 145 
(Senate Estimates hearings).This response reflects a generic approach of neither confirming nor denying 
the existence or substance of national security matters. 
257 Strict liability offences are created for the disclo ure of operational information by persons the subject 
of a warrant or a lawyer variously involved either at the time of the warrant or subsequently on behalf of 
the subject, within two years of the end date of a warrant: see ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) s 34VAA (2) and 
(3)(a) and 3(b)(i), (ii) and (iii). Operational information is broadly defined. See the discussion ‘Recent 
and Prospective Executive Claims For Enhanced Power: ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth)’ 
above. 
258 See ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) ss 34VAA (5). 
259 See ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) ss 34VAA (1). 
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importance in compensating for these deficiencies. The criteria and the need for 
judicial approval in a persona designata capacity as the issuing authority provide 
some qualitative and methodological appraisal of the case supporting a warrant and 
a degree of independence in assessing that case. Far more stringent criteria were 
moved as amendments by the minor parties to the bill,260 but were rejected by the 
major parties. These proposed amendments would have provided a clear nexus to 
actuality or likelihood of the commission or involvement in an actual or prospective 
terrorism related offence.261  
 
The existing criteria reflect, if imperfectly, the previous ministerial and departmen-
tal justification that these are warrants of last resort.262 The “last resort” principle 
embodies residual notions of constraint, exceptional ty, proportionality and neces-
sity in justifying this drastic paradigm shift to the detention and questioning of 
innocent persons for intelligence gathering purposes. Indirectly, the “last resort” 
principle is a practical device in organising intelligence gathering priorities and 
resource use, encouraging the use of less overtly intrusive methods of intelligence 
gathering,263 as well as promoting a greater focus on analysis, coordination, ex-
change and extrapolation from information gleaned from existing sources and 
methods. Adherence to such restraints more closely approximates liberal democ-
ratic values. 
 
Relaxation of warrant criteria would institute a more speculative approach to anti-
terrorism intelligence gathering. Such a development is likely to prove counter-
productive as intelligence resources, human and technical, are expended on matters 
with an increasingly tenuous connection to substantial terrorism offences. Indeed, a 
major explanation for the delay under the existing le islative arrangements in 
focusing intelligence efforts on Brigitte’s presenc in Australia, following an initial 
                                                    
260 See the Australian Democrat proposed amendment to ASIO Legislation Amendment Terrorism Bill 
2002 [No 2] (Cth) Amendment Sheet No 2923 13 June 2003 by Senator Greig adding to the issuing 
criteria of a questioning and detention warrant and the Greens proposed amendment to the ASIO Legisla-
tion Amendment Terrorism Bill 2002 [No 2] (Cth) Sheet No 2957 –rev 17 June 2003 by Senator Nettle 
proposing a change to the consent process. 
261 See Senate, Hansard, 19 June 2003, 11758 to 11769 for debate on the Australian Democrats amend-
ment and Senate, Hansard, 19 June 2003, 11769 on the Green amendments. 
262 This is particularly reflected in the s 34C (3)(b) criterion ‘that relying on other methods of collecting 
that intelligence would be ineffective’. Attorney General Williams consistently emphasised the ‘last 
resort’ nature of the warrants: see House of Represntatives, Hansard, 20 March 2003, 13172 and 
Williams, above n 46 and A-G’s Press Release, ‘Final Passage Of ASIO Powers Legislation’, 26 June 
2003.  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Web+Pages/E8A8FB88011F66> (29 June 2003).  
Submissions to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee by ASIO and the Attorney-
General’s Department argued the exceptionality of the ‘last resort’ application of detention warrants:  
Senate Constitutional and Legal References Committee, Hansard, 18 November 2002, 110 and 125. 
263 See the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) ss 25A (Computer access warrant), 26 (listening devices), 26A, 26B and 
26C (tracking devices), 27 (inspection of postal articles) and 27AA (inspection of delivery service 
articles). 
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and repeated alert from the French authorities, was th t it was not seen as a matter 
of high priority.264  
 
V CONCLUSION: A MISGUIDED REFORM PARADIGM 
 
In reflecting upon the excesses of the executive branch’s reaction to the Brigitte 
incident, the observations of two High Court judges made in national security 
contexts are singularly appropriate: 
 
History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democ-
ratic institutions have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done 
not seldom by those holding the executive power.265 
 
It is of the essence of a free society that a balance is struck between the security that 
is desirable to protect society as a whole and the saf guards that are necessary to 
ensure individual liberty. But in the long run the safety of a democracy rests upon 
the common commitment of its citizens to the safeguarding of each man’s liberty, 
and the balance must tilt that way.266 
 
The preceding examination of various reform claims for enlarging executive power 
argues that there is neither a rational nor a substantia ed case for the Attorney Gen-
eral’s claims to loosen the constraints on the unprecedented detention and question-
ing powers in the ASIO Legislation (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2003 (Cth).  
 
Implementing such reform proposals will compound recent inroads on fundamental 
tenets governing the relationship between the citizen and the state, further diminish-
ing critical rule of law principles such as the accountability of institutions, due 
process, separation of power, scrutiny of authority and constraints on the exercise of 
discretions. Extending the legislation to further circumstances of non-suspects, 
demands that a cogent and publicly documented case be established by the execu-
tive and rigorously tested in deliberative mechanisms, such as parliamentary inquir-
ies and media analysis. Increases in extraordinary power must also be tempered 
with the development of new and specific accountabili y mechanisms and controls 
ensuring proportion and necessity. 
 
The Brigitte incident has given prominence to the political opportunities and usages 
of contemporary national security issues, in both a party political sense and through 
diminutions of legal and political accountability within a democratic polity. It is a 
case study par excellence of a democracy’s susceptibility to a crisis response, 
                                                    
264 Hon P Ruddock House of Representatives, Hansard, 4 November 2003, 21855. See also the evidence 
of Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty before th  Senate Estimates hearings: Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee, Hansard, 3 November 2003, 132-133. 
265 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187 (Dixon J). 
266 Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 412, 456 (Brennan J). 
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precluding mature legislative deliberation, rounded and consultative policy devel-
opment and asserting that amending legislation must be peedily passed. Significant 
elements of that crisis response may arise through strategic suggestion, ambivalence 
and hypotheses in the public communication of counter-terrorism information. The 
executive invocation of the ‘operational information’ criterion severely curtails such 
communication, whilst simultaneously raising a claim for legislative reform. Con-
tinual pressure for ‘enhancement’ of counter terrorism laws overestimates the 
capacity of legal frameworks to address the threat of terrorism, instead of being 
considered as one of many components in a holistic framework of domestic, re-
gional and foreign policy counter-terrorism responses.    
 
Executive control is also strengthened in the fact tha broader review of legislative 
reform, by public and expert contributions to a parliamentary committee of inquiry, 
is undesirable and consultation should be confined to the party room, including, to 
facilitate passage, consultation within the Oppositi n party room.267 An Opposi-
tion’s institutional role in seriously appraising and critiquing significant, unpredict-
able erosions of civil and political rights under boader intelligence gathering 
powers is equated with weakness and vacillation. Increasingly, the Opposition is co-
opted into concurrence with Government proposals aggressively undermining 
rights, as well as attempting to neutralise Governme t political advantage in this 
issue, possibly by outbidding the Government in the conferral of executive orien-
tated counter-terrorism powers. Such a development would constitute a mutual 
conflation of partisan interests with the security of the nation. 
 
Increasingly, the Australian counter-terrorism legislative response can be seen as 
serially eroding civil and political rights, producing no guaranteed enhancement of 
security but disproportionately compromising democrati  institutions, practices and 
accountability mechanisms. Such imbalances produced by this “balancing” model 
of reconciling legal formulations of security and liberty is best explained through 
several parallel developments. The unifying thread is the heightened assertions of 
executive authority over public debate and legislative reform, with a willingness to 
pursue party political and electoral interests as synonymous with the security of the 
nation.  
 
The fear generated and crystallised by the Brigitte incident has produced an un-
precedented legislative suppression of the ability of the media to report on detention 
and questioning warrants,268 where no demonstrated security risk exists and where 
such reporting constitutes an essential democratic accountability measure. Describ-
ing such amendments as merely “technical” exposes a serious vacuum in sophisti-
cated policy development in the fundamental values at stake. Such approaches will 
inevitably diminish civil and political rights by appeasing every government claim 
made for an enhancement of power. That appeasement will only encourage both 
                                                    
267 See Hon Philip Ruddock, ‘News Conference at Parliament House’, Transcript 27 November 2003 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Web+Pages/E80E)CDFA427F8> (5 December  
2003)  
268 ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth). 
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further governmental claims for expanded powers, as well as an opportunistic 
testing of the limits of compliance at vulnerable political moments for the Opposi-
tion and minor parties.269 
 





                                                    
269 The characteristics of this appeasement have been variously identified as a lack of commitment to 
matters of principle, contributing to a pattern of government misrepresentation regarding powers and 
safeguards in the legislation, and capitulation when s rious erosions of civil liberties have been unsatis-
factorily addressed: Hocking, above n 17, 220, 226, 7.  
